

and climate change. Although scholars may disagree with some particular analyses, they will find the book, as a whole, invaluable in furthering their understanding of Asian security politics and the interactions between Asian security and global issues. Since all of these topics are timely and policy relevant, the policy community will also find the chapters interesting and inspiring.

Third, this book is not only rich in empirics but also diverse in theoretical perspectives. Although the contributors have an analytical consensus to emphasize the importance of the regional-global nexus, they apply different theoretical frameworks to their empirical analyses. Consequently, their arguments are diverse in perspective, but complementary in essence. For example, on the question of Asian regional order and U.S. hegemony, there are at least three different views in the book. While Mastanduno is pessimistic about U.S. strategy in Asia and asserts that the United States would like to “muddle along reactively” toward Asia in the future (p. 81), Goh optimistically argues that the regional hierarchy structured by U.S. hegemony is relatively stable in Asia. In addition, Peou suggests that U.S. hegemony is a negative factor in building an East Asian security community.

The book has one minor unsolved problem, however, which deserves further research in the future. The concept of regional-global nexus is still unclear theoretically. Although Brian Job unpacked the concept of regional-global nexus through the levels of analysis framework, he admitted that “specification of the regional-global security nexus in a precise and static representation, in principle, is not possible” (p. 32). The book sets up a broad theoretical framework, which includes both material and nonmaterial forces across the regional and global levels that influence Asian security politics. Although the richness of the regional-global nexus framework is admirable, more rigorous theoretical and conceptual studies along the directions laid out here are needed in the future.

In sum, William Tow has edited an excellent, comprehensive, and innovative work on the study of Asian security politics. It should be read by scholars from both area studies and IR who are interested in the dynamics of Asian security.

**The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars.** By David H. Ucko. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 268p. \$26.95.

**The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing.** By James Igoe Walsh. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 208p. \$40.00.

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— Mark Phythian, *University of Leicester*

These books provide incisive analyses of two fundamental challenges faced by the United States in its “war on terror” response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The first concerns the need to relearn principles of counterinsurgency applied in Vietnam, and the second concerns the need to navigate the challenges that arise from intelligence sharing, the post-9/11 necessity of which is widely accepted but the costs of which are potentially high.

*The New Counterinsurgency Era* is an articulate and thoughtful appeal for institutional acceptance of the continued centrality of counterinsurgency to the U.S. military. As David Ucko makes clear, counterinsurgency and stabilization operations are complex multilevel endeavors. They aim to deliver stabilization as the first stage of a state-building process and involve the deployment of ground forces in the midst of local civilian populations in what are, to varying degrees, essentially nonpermissive operational environments. The adversary remains elusive; the loyalty of the local population, into which the adversary dissolves, cannot be fully relied upon, even as infrastructure is developed for its benefit; language barriers militate against the easy overcoming of suspicion; and local security partners are weak and can exhibit divided loyalties. For these very reasons, such operations have not been the U.S. military’s preferred form of deployment, and the lessons learned from confronting this type of challenge in Vietnam were subsequently “unlearned.” Indeed, the overriding lesson that the U.S. military took from Vietnam was to avoid future Vietnams. Counterinsurgency remained, in a formal sense, marginal to U.S. military thinking. Ucko provides a clear analysis of why this continued to be the case, considering interventions in the 1980s and 1990s, the impact of MOOTWs (military operations other than war), the so-called revolution in military affairs, and, from 2001, the Bush/Rumsfeld approach to defense and place of stabilization/peacekeeping within U.S. military thinking.

As a consequence, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 made no provision for stabilization operations, despite Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s recognition that “we don’t want Afghanistan a year from now to go back to being a place that harbors terrorists, so it is in our interest to be attentive to what kind of government comes along” (p. 56). Similarly, there was no role for stabilization or counterinsurgency doctrine in planning for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Hence, the U.S. military was unprepared for the guerrilla war that followed (despite CIA warnings as to the possibility), which Rumsfeld initially attributed to a few “dead-enders.”

There have now been a number of accounts of this unpreparedness and the gradual response—relearning and applying the lessons that arose from the experience of Vietnam—but one of the key strengths of Ucko’s book lies in the detail with which he maps out the evolution and nature of that response (what he terms “innovation under fire”) and provides a clear account of its intellectual drivers. While the U.S. military increasingly addressed the

question of counterinsurgency during 2004–5, it did so in an inconsistent manner that treated the requirement as a temporary aberration. However, in 2005 a counterinsurgency community began to emerge that was based around figures like H. R. McMaster and David Petraeus. As a consequence of its growing influence, by the time the 2006 “Quadrennial Defense Review” was published, counterinsurgency was occupying a central place in the military’s vision of armed forces as “proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat. . . . They will understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns” (p. 83).

Ucko’s key argument, however, is that even though the post-2005 emphasis on counterinsurgency delivered results on the ground in Iraq, extended the influence of Petraeus and the counterinsurgency community, and achieved some degree of institutionalization of counterinsurgency thinking within the Department of Defense, this community still faced entrenched opposition. Debate continued as to how much focus should be devoted to counterinsurgency in an institution that remained “firmly anchored to conventional priorities and programs” (p. 166)—especially in light of a belief that there must be “no more Iraqs.” For Ucko: “Ultimately the many achievements of the COIN [counterinsurgency] community and a shift to counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq were, much like previous developments, events conducted on the sidelines of an institution unwilling or unable to displace its established priorities” (p. 167).

Hence, the point of Ucko’s book is to warn against the risk of unlearning the lessons of Iraq, thus leaving the U.S. military unprepared for future Iraqs. However, for others the lesson of Iraq is that in the future, the United States should avoid small wars of choice and so obviate an institutional emphasis on counterinsurgency. The implicit question here is the kind of future wars in which the United States is most likely to be engaged. The author’s view is clear. He cites the military historian Michael Howard’s warning: “The military may protest that this is not the kind of war that they joined up to fight, and taxpayers that they see little return for their money. [Yet] this is the only war we are likely to get: it is also the only kind of peace. So let us have no illusions about it” (p. 176). However, the history of institutional learning within the U.S. military with regard to counterinsurgency suggests that Ucko may well be disappointed. Nevertheless, his clearly argued and perceptive book will itself inform the ongoing debate and so may yet shape it.

The post-9/11 challenges that the United States and its allies have faced in collecting their own human intelligence on Al Qaeda and its affiliates have generated considerable debate about intelligence sharing. The potential

benefits of this are clear, but the potential pitfalls are numerous and serious—the case of “Curveball,” the Iraqi defector debriefed by the German Intelligence Service (BND—the Bundesnachrichtendienst), whose false claims about Iraq’s biological weapons program fed into the Bush administration’s case for war with Iraq, illustrates these well. As the existing literature on intelligence sharing makes clear, issues of trust are central.

In his tightly argued book, James Igoe Walsh builds on this basic insight to categorize the barriers to effective intelligence sharing as being twofold. Firstly, there is a bargaining problem. Potential partners must negotiate around the kinds of intelligence that each will collect, how it will be shared, and how the costs will be met. Secondly, there is the enforcement problem. This arises from the risk of what Walsh terms “defection”—that is, where states renege on their promises to share intelligence. Defection can take various forms and involve altering, fabricating, or withholding intelligence. The risk is heightened in the case of states with weak central structures where intelligence services enjoy high degrees of autonomy—a situation not unheard of in the context of the war on terror.

The purpose of *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* is to propose a solution based on an application of the principles of relational contracting, a branch of transaction cost economics. As Walsh explains, the key insight is “that firms do not simply exist to produce goods and services but also to manage the relations among their members by creating hierarchical relationships in which owners and managers exercise considerable direct control over their subordinates” (p. 15). Applied to intelligence sharing, this means that the potentially high transaction costs that bargaining and enforcement represent can be managed to ensure that they do not derail otherwise mutually advantageous cooperation. However, the solution relies on intelligence-sharing partners accepting the existence of a hierarchy, of dominant and subordinate parties, and accepting that the dominant party “is responsible for making the major decisions, and the subordinate party or parties recognize the authority of the dominant party and are responsible for complying with these decisions” (p. 17). Walsh argues that the contract that forms the basis of the hierarchy would give the dominant state the right to interpret the agreement, the right to establish oversight mechanisms to ensure subordinate state compliance, and the right to punish defection by subordinate states.

In terms of international relations and intelligence theory, this is an interesting, distinctive, and bold proposal, and it deserves to be debated at length and in comparable detail to that provided by Walsh. Considerations of space mean that I can only begin to do this briefly. One obvious response to the proposal is that it is incredibly invasive. As Walsh outlines: “[T]he dominant country’s intelligence services might require their counterparts to hand over some

of the raw information on which they base their conclusions so that its accuracy can be evaluated [or] the dominant state may insist on directly managing the other country's intelligence service, supervising the activities of their counterpart's collection activities, and vetting the sources and employees of their partner's services. The dominant state may assign its personnel to policymaking or operational tasks in the subordinate state's agencies" (p. 20). The realist assumptions that tend to underpin investment in intelligence the world over would militate against any such open-ended contractual (in a theoretical sense) arrangements, which are more likely to be limited to specific circumstances and even then require considerable incentivization.

This also begs the question of what is in it for subordinate states. Walsh accepts that creating hierarchies is expensive for the dominant state (p. 128), but his case study of hierarchical sharing with Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt might have explored this question more fully. While his proposal would clearly lessen the risk of defection or cheating that dominant states confront, it is not clear that it offers similar reassurance to subordinate states. Why should they trust the dominant state? Hence, trust is not removed as an issue; it is simply displaced. Finally, when the relationship is underpinned by a form of contract that takes us beyond common interest and mutual trust, I am not sure that "intelligence *sharing*" is any longer the most appropriate term. Sharing is essentially voluntary; contractually derived liaison is not.

In sum, then, both of these clearly argued books make a substantial contribution to post-9/11 security debates. Developments on the ground in Iraq will inform assessments of the success of the counterinsurgency campaign there over the medium term, but for the reasons outlined by Michael Howard, Ucko's central argument has an importance that goes beyond current campaigns. For his part, Walsh has produced an innovative and fascinating book that advances the debate over intelligence sharing. It deserves to be widely debated and should become a reference point in future discussion of the issue.

**Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent.** By Barbara F. Walter. New York: Cambridge

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— Stacie E. Goddard, *Wellesley College*

When faced with separatist movements, why do states choose violence over accommodation? War, after all, is an exceedingly costly outcome, one that any rational decision maker should eagerly avoid. Yet, more often than not, states reject separatist demands, and opt instead to fight bloody civil wars.

Why states choose war over accommodation is the puzzle that drives Barbara Walter's excellent book, her second

major project on the causes of civil war. Most scholars suggest that states fight because they value territory, which "often contains important natural resources, serves a vital security function, or plays a critical role in the identity of a country" (p. 5). But Walter contends that while these existing accounts are intuitive, they are insufficient—they fail to explain why states pay such an awful price for what is ultimately a negotiable good.

Key to solving this puzzle, the author argues, is reputation. States fight not because territory has any particular value but "because fighting helps them deter other groups from seeking secession in the future" (p. 7). State leaders must worry not only about the stakes in the present negotiations but also about the costs of future claims. And while accommodation might prevent war, it also serves as a signal to other minorities that the state is weak, prompting additional challenges too costly for a state to bear. To preserve a reputation for toughness and deter further deterioration of the state, leaders will thus refuse to yield to separatist demands.

Reputation is a concept that has fallen out of favor in international relations, with scholars arguing that there is little evidence to suggest that reputations actually affect state behavior (e.g., see John Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*, 1996). Walter tackles these criticisms head-on, suggesting that researchers ask not whether reputations matter but under what conditions states will seek to protect their image. She parses through these conditions in a theory chapter that meticulously details when and why state leaders care enough about their reputation to resort to violence. First and foremost among these conditions, she argues, is the number of possible separatist groups within the state itself. As she argues, "a government's decision to accommodate a group seeking self-determination will be inversely related to the number of ethnic groups in that country" (p. 25). The more potential challengers, the more a government must preserve a reputation for toughness, lest it invite further challenges to its sovereignty.

Walter also elucidates the conditions under which separatist groups are likely to challenge the state. Separatists, after all, should recognize that governments care about their reputations, which means that there will be more or less ideal times to demand territory (indeed, one thing that really differentiates Walter's book from other studies of ethnic conflict is her insistence that *both* governments and separatists are rational actors—separatist groups are not irrational but are equal partners in strategic interaction). She argues that separatists will wait until reputational costs are low to pursue their case. When there are few other challengers, for example, or when a leader's tenure is almost up, a state's concerns about reputation should diminish, and minorities should expect more success when pressing their claims.

The bulk of the book tests these hypotheses with three different methods. The first of these is an experimental