

Defense Forces was left to create, in a fairly ad hoc manner, the capacity to address the RMA, often following U.S. examples. It is reasonable to argue that a nation's culture will influence the development of its bureaucratic structures. It is also fair to say that those structures will significantly shape the subsequent culture of groups and individuals, presenting them with powerful de facto constraints and pathways, leaving the relative explanatory power of strategic culture much less clear.

DAVID W. KEARN, JR.
St. John's University

The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing by James Igoe Walsh.
New York, Columbia University Press, 2009. 208 pp. \$40.00.

Books about intelligence tend to fall into three categories. First are works by journalists, who tend to highlight failure, scandal, or corruption. The second category consists of tell-all books by former practitioners, who cannot "tell all" because of security restrictions; these books are interesting but lack depth. The third category, spy fiction, is how the public tends to be informed about intelligence, entertaining but hardly accurate. James Igoe Walsh of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte has taken an entirely different and welcome approach. He has used elements of social science theory to explain how nations share intelligence, and his effort makes fascinating reading.

Scholars who study the intelligence process have long sought the development of intelligence theory as a way of creating a more-systematic exploration of security service operations. Intelligence services almost always face restrictions because of budgetary constraints, a lack of personnel skill sets, and limits on the ground they can cover. Therefore, they need to reach out to the services of other nations to assist them in collecting and analyzing intelligence data, or carrying out special operations. Walsh, using a series of case studies, has set out to explain the theory behind intelligence sharing and how it has played out in practice.

His main theme is that intelligence sharing is governed by relational contracting, so that larger states, with dominant intelligence services, seek to establish hierarchy over the services of equal or lesser states, to include controls, funding, and training, thus laying the groundwork for sharing. His theory also explains why, in some cases, a lack of hierarchy reduces the likelihood of sharing, especially in regard to sensitive or closely held intelligence data. He posits that dominating intelligence services worry that their partners may "defect" or renege on agreements. This use of the term "defect" is confusing, because defecting in the intelligence world means to turn traitor and give oneself up to an adversary. Nonetheless, renegeing on agreements, or more likely, refusing to share intelligence, is a constant headache in relations between intelligence services.

Walsh has chosen an interesting mix of case studies to illustrate his hypothesis. These range from close and co-equal partnerships, such as the long-standing

relationship between the U.S. and British services, to one in which the United States created a subordinate partner in the post-World War II West German service, to one of limited and sometimes hostile partnership with the French. Walsh then discusses hierarchy in the cases of Colombia and South Vietnam, and the lack of hierarchy in the European Union (EU). In this latter case, the EU has yet to develop a fully operational intelligence system, because the member states seem to prefer bilateral to multi-lateral sharing. Intelligence services have traditionally avoided multi-lateral sharing because of the fear that control of sensitive sources or intelligence methods might be compromised.

Unfortunately, Walsh has missed a case that fits his hypothesis almost exactly. During the Cold War, the Soviet KGB intelligence service exerted almost complete control of its East European intelligence partners. This hierarchy disappeared with the collapse of the communist empire. Walsh's hypothesis might also explain why intelligence sharing is not working within the U.S. intelligence system, since there is little hierarchy. The Director of National Intelligence has little authority over the 16 agencies in the U.S. system, and thus little control over this complex system.

Walsh has made a valuable, groundbreaking contribution to our understanding of intelligence sharing. Perhaps his work will spur others to explore areas in which theory could be applied to the arcane world of intelligence.

ARTHUR S. HULNICK
Boston University

Saving Schools: From Horace Mann to Virtual Learning by Paul Peterson.
Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010. 336 pp. \$25.95.

“In the late 1950s,” according to Paul Peterson, “the American educational system was the envy of the world” (p. 9). Since then, however, we have entered a period of “educational stagnation” (p. 11). Our students’ time under instruction is shorter than that of students in competing economies, our graduation rates lower, and our test scores equally unimpressive. Where did we go wrong?

Peterson offers his answers in *Saving Schools*, a sweeping history of the politics of American education that begins at the framing of the Constitution and ends in the Internet age. The history is told through short biographies of six men: Horace Mann, John Dewey, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Albert Shanker, William Bennett, and James Coleman. The promise of transformation comes through the story of Julie Young and the Florida Virtual School.

Peterson’s goal is to trace the impact of ideas on policy through educational leadership, and to offer insights into where things started to go downhill and how we can regain upward momentum. It is often a story of unintended consequences—of the lofty ideals of Horace Mann and his fellow reformers undermined by “ethnic politicians elected by immigrants whose values differed from their own” (p. 14), or of a civil rights movement that subjected