Many of Storr’s recommendations are counter to current practice, but are, nevertheless, soundly reasoned. He takes on the infatuation with more and better information and looks at officer development and the qualities that make a good commander.

The densely packed book often challenges conventional wisdom. Whether you agree or not, his ideas are documented and well-reasoned. To ignore them puts one at the peril of overlooking insights gleaned from good research and analysis. While there are some who feel the days of major combat operations are over, there is evidence that small unit combined arms operations skills are needed for any kind of combat. The Human Face of War helps envision a better way to build a force that can be formidable in the conduct of combined arms combat.

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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING, James Walsh, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009, 208 pages, $40.00. The U.S. intelligence community received considerable scrutiny in the aftermath of 9/11 for a lack of intra-governmental intelligence sharing. In response to this deficit, the Bush administration launched a sweeping information-sharing initiative to remedy perceived federal intelligence stovepiping. However, as former president Bush made clear in his National Strategy for Information Sharing, a strong intelligence community relies on more than just U.S. intelligence. Federal, state, and local authorities must partner with private sector and foreign governments to obtain a complete intelligence picture. The focus of James Walsh’s new book is this last element, the foreign partners. Walsh presents a well-reasoned and detailed account of how nations trade intelligence for money, training, and protection. Through several case studies, the author advances his theory on how countries can obtain more reliable information from their foreign partners through hierarchical relationships.

Walsh points at distrust as the main barrier to forming effective international intelligence relationships. The distrust is often felt by both parties. For example, a developing country may exaggerate its intelligence to garner favor and financial support from the United States. After a relationship is established, the country may fear the United States will abandon it unless it produces more intelligence, while the United States will remain skeptical of the origins and reliability of the intelligence. The only way to mitigate this distrust is to ensure that the benefits of adhering to the intelligence-sharing agreement far outweigh the costs associated with maintaining the agreement.

The main question Walsh seeks to answer is: How can governments overcome policy divides, intelligence manipulation, and deep-seated distrust to arrive at a mutually beneficial intelligence-sharing agreement? The author seeks answers in historical case studies, including the diverse relationships America has formed with foreign partners in the post-9/11 fight against international terrorism. America’s robust intelligence-sharing agreement with European countries is built on a mutual trust that stems from common interests, similar government policies, and a history of cooperation. Simultaneously, countries like Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt have a less intuitive, yet still crucial, relationship with America. Although these countries have extremely valuable intelligence, their differing policies and interests create a mutual distrust between the governments. Through a hierarchical agreement, in which the United States provides substantial financing, oversight, and training, these unlikely allies have provided invaluable intelligence. Finally, juxtaposed against the successful relationships is America’s non-relationship with Iran and Syria. As Walsh makes clear, when the policy differences and feelings of distrust are too significant, even a hierarchical agreement will not remedy the divide.

The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing offers a fascinating glimpse into the world of international intelligence, but it is by no means a stand-alone primer. Walsh makes a valiant effort to explain one aspect of an extraordinarily complex issue. That said, readers hoping to learn about the entire U.S. information sharing environment will be disappointed. In addition, the author admits his inability to review the large body of classified information significantly limited his research, leaving Walsh’s conclusions more questionable. Despite these limitations, Walsh’s work is a solid contribution to the growing body of scholarship on intelligence sharing.

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A PATH OUT OF THE DESERT: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East, Kenneth Pollack, Random House, New York, 2008, 592 pages, $18.00. Readers who are hoping that Kenneth Pollack’s A Path Out of the Desert offers a plan for a quick exit from the Middle East will be disappointed. Pollack’s sobering expectation is that our path out of the desert will be measured in decades, not years. Still, the book deserves to be read, not only because of Pollack’s track record for clear insights into Middle East policy, but also on the book’s individual merits. A Path Out of the Desert is a cogent analysis of the challenges the United States faces in the Middle East. Pollack argues that political Islam, internal strife, and terrorism constitute threats to U.S. interests in the region—oil, Israel, and America’s Arab allies—and will keep the United States involved there for decades. The only way to extricate forces from the region is to stay involved there until the region’s states have overcome the chronic internal instability.

Pollack’s solution for this chronic instability is a patient,