

International Cooperation, Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism

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Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that the answer to this question is yes, and that one state may sponsor terrorist attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states. We suggest, in contrast, that positive or cooperative actions invite terrorist attacks from a different source: nonstate groups wishing to spoil interstate cooperation that they oppose. We assess this argument with a dyadic dataset using monthly data on transnational terrorist attacks and cooperative and noncooperative actions between states. Our results suggest that spoiling in response to interstate cooperation is an important determinant of transnational terrorism.

KEYWORDS *conflict, cooperation, terrorism*

Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that interactions between states can influence the amount of transnational terrorism they experience. Findley, Piazza, and Young (2012) find that states that are long-standing rivals are the victims of more terrorist attacks. Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) conclude that weaker countries have incentives to sponsor terrorist attacks against stronger states. And Milton (2011) argues that threatening policies by one state can attract transnational terrorism from groups hosted overseas.

Two characteristics stand out in these studies. First, most conclude that it is noncooperative or hostile actions by a state that lead it to become the victim of transnational terrorist attacks. This makes intuitive sense; we would

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expect that a country on the receiving end of hostile actions might retaliate, and one form of retaliation is to sponsor terrorist attacks. At least one set of articles, however, finds that cooperation is associated with more, not fewer, transnational terrorist attacks. Neumayer and Plumper (2010, 2011) conclude that allied states are more likely to be attacked because dissenting groups may launch attacks against states that ally with their home country. This suggests one mechanism through which cooperation, rather than conflict, can encourage terrorist attacks and brings to mind other terrorist attacks motivated in part by interstate cooperation rather than conflict. For example, the Mubarak regime in Egypt cooperated with Israel for decades to reduce the threat of militant attacks on Israel from Egyptian soil. Mubarak's successors continued, and in some ways, strengthened this cooperation. Armed groups favoring a rupture with Israel subsequently launched numerous terrorist attacks in the Sinai peninsula against targets associated with Israel, including rocket attacks on Israel itself and a pipeline carrying natural gas from Egypt to Israel (Fahim and El Sheikh 2012). Similarly, cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia during and after the First Gulf War, which included the stationing of American military personnel in the kingdom, led to a string of terrorist attacks against Western targets beginning in 1995. A key motivation for these attacks was to end Saudi-American security cooperation, which the attacks' perpetrators viewed as tantamount to occupation of the kingdom (Hegghammer 2006).

Second, existing studies examine structural or slowly changing characteristics of interstate relations. The unit of analysis is typically the country-year or the dyad-year, and key variables such as rivalry or alliance commitments change infrequently across these temporal units. Such research designs do not shed much light on how cooperative or hostile actions by one state influence terrorism directed at it in the short run of weeks and months. But this short run is important for both scholarly and policy reasons. If transnational terrorism is a strategic activity chosen in response to the specific actions of a targeted state, we would expect it to be temporally proximate to these actions in order to most effectively influence the target. Consider again how Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation after the overthrow of Mubarak might have influenced transnational terrorism. It would be difficult to use annual data to assess this relationship because the end of the Mubarak regime and the increase in transnational terrorism occurred within the same year. In other words, it would be difficult to assess in this case if cooperation produces more terrorism, or if terrorism leads to a deepening of cooperation, or both. Understanding how, if at all, transnational terrorism responds to and influences diplomatic interactions in the short run gives us greater leverage to disentangle the directions of causation. It should also be of interest to policymakers, since it may allow them to avoid taking actions that increase the risk of terrorist attacks in the near future.

We hypothesize that *cooperative* interstate actions invite transnational terrorism in the short run because groups within a state, operating independently of the central government, may oppose cooperation with another state. Terrorist attacks by such “spoilers” lead the victim to conclude that the originating state either sponsored the aggression or cannot control the violent groups it hosts. Either conclusion leads the victim to reduce the value it attaches to cooperation. The logic of spoiling has been used to explain how political violence contributed to the collapse of peace processes between governments and their domestic foes in Israel, Sri Lanka, and other cases (Kydd and Walter 2002; Stedman 1997). We extend this argument to the domain of interstate relations and suggest that nonstate actors have strong incentives to use terrorist attacks to prevent or counteract cooperation between states.

In what follows, we first discuss the extant literature and explain the logic of our hypothesis that positive, cooperative acts should be associated with a subsequent short-term increase in terrorist attacks. We then discuss the events data on which our analysis is based. Our statistical results are consistent with the argument that cooperation produces more terrorism in the short run. We find little evidence, at least in the short run, that negative or noncooperative gestures influence patterns of transnational terrorism. The concluding section discusses how future work could build upon these findings and how states interested in cooperation can achieve their objectives without becoming the targets of terrorist attacks.

DIPLOMATIC GESTURES AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

How do the political, military, and diplomatic actions of pairs of countries influence transnational terrorist attacks between them? Such actions, which we term *diplomatic gestures*, can be thought of as lying on a continuum from more conflictual or negative actions to more positive or cooperative actions. Negative diplomatic gestures threaten to impose costs on a target and include expelling diplomats, using force, or breaking off negotiations. Positive diplomatic gestures promise benefits and include providing foreign assistance, military support, and trade concessions (see Keohane 1984). In what follows, we term the state from which a terrorist attack originates or by whom it is sponsored the *source*, and the state that is the victim of the terrorist attack the *target*. We focus on how the diplomatic gestures of the target state influence terrorist attacks against it that originate in the source state.

Considerable existing research suggests that negative, noncooperative gestures by a target would invite terrorist attacks from the source. We lay out this argument next. We then develop the alternative hypothesis based on the logic of spoiling that positive, cooperative gestures directed toward the source by the target result in the target being the victim of more transnational terrorist attacks.

Negative Gestures, International Bargaining, and Transnational Terrorism

Consider first why negative gestures might be associated with increased transnational terrorism. This approach assumes that the source country exercises effective control over a transnational terrorist group, meaning it can direct the timing and targets of the group's violence. States are more likely to activate such terrorist groups when the expected utility of conventional armed conflict is low. That is, when war is expected to be particularly costly, some states may attempt to harm their opponents in less direct ways, such as through sponsorship of terrorist attacks.

Several studies have found the use of state-sponsored terrorism to be directly related to the costs of conventional armed conflict. Findley et al. (2012) demonstrate that rival states are substantially more likely to experience terrorist attacks than nonrivals. Rivals, they argue, engage in ongoing bargaining over highly salient and conflictual issues. The costs of warfare for rivals are therefore particularly high because of the issues at stake and the resolve of each state. State-sponsorship of terrorism can offer rivals a viable alternative to full-scale war. Other studies have also found that power preponderance makes transnational terrorism more likely (Byman 2005; Sobek and Braithwaite 2005). The logic is the same here, but only for the weaker state in a dyad. The weaker state cannot accomplish its goals through conventional armed conflict due to the high costs of attacking a much stronger state and may instead choose furtive sponsorship of terrorist organizations as an alternative means of harming its adversary. Conrad (2011) finds this to be particularly likely when the probability of retaliation is low, emphasizing that state sponsorship of terrorism is a strategic choice. These recent empirical findings support the theoretical expectations of an earlier string of research that links state-sponsored terrorism to the expected cost of war (e.g., Kupperman, Van Ostpal, and Williamson 1982; O'Brien 1996).

States may therefore turn to sponsorship of terrorist attacks against their adversaries to increase their bargaining leverage while avoiding the risks and costs of war. Sponsorship of terrorist attacks should be most likely in response to negative diplomatic gestures by the target that impose costs on the source. Sponsors minimize the risk of retaliation by keeping its sponsorship secret from the target and the rest of the international community. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H1: Among dyads, an increase in negative gestures from the target to the source country is associated with more transnational terrorist attacks against the target that originate in the source country.

Covert sponsorship means that the target may not realize that the terrorist attacks are intended to push it to make concessions. Why, then, would the source expect that terrorist attacks it sponsors covertly would generate

benefits in the form of concessions by the target? One way that covertly sponsoring terrorist attacks could generate concessions is by distracting the target government from international negotiations. A terrorist attack creates a new problem that the target government must address. This may lead the target government to reallocate some attention and political capital to counterterrorism. This could result in concessions to the source country. But this strategy might be ineffective if, for example, the target government reduces its attention to some issue other than international negotiations with the source.

Two additional characteristics of terrorism might make such a gamble worthwhile for the source country. First, terrorism is inexpensive. Terrorist attacks require fewer resources to organize and carry out than do many other tactics that the source might adopt. Second, terrorism has outsized effects on targets. Terrorist attacks aim to create mass fear by targeting non-combatants. This can generate great public pressure on the authorities to respond quickly and decisively (Hoffman 2006). Thus, even though the benefits to the source country may be uncertain, sponsoring terrorism may be a cost-effective strategy because it is inexpensive and generates a powerful public reaction. Balanced against this, though, are the risks that sponsorship of terrorism will be discovered by the target and by other states. Such discovery could impose considerable costs on the source. Even the suspicion that a state sponsors terrorism could reduce its credibility in the eyes of other states and nonstate actors, making them more reluctant to strike bargains at the negotiating table. It is not clear to us, therefore, that responding to negative gestures with terrorist attacks can reliably provide rewards to a sponsor.

Positive Gestures, Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism

We theorize, on the other hand, that cooperative gestures are likely to increase transnational terrorism in the short term. We base this explanation on an assessment of the incentives and opportunities that face nonstate political actors, rather than states, who are willing to use violence to achieve their aims. The logic outlined previously assumes that the source-country government directly, if covertly, exercises influence over the targeting decisions of terrorist groups it sponsors. Frequently, though, this will not be the case. Instead, terrorist groups may make targeting decisions independently of the state in which they are based. Much transnational terrorism originates in states that are ineffective at policing their territory, where the authorities do not have the means to prevent terrorist groups from organizing. Terrorist groups based in “fragile” states such as Somalia and Yemen have exploited these countries as safe havens from which to launch terrorist attacks in recent years (Piazza 2008). It is also possible that elements within the source country’s own government might covertly sponsor terrorism without the

knowledge of the government's central leadership (Byman 2008; Byman and Kreps 2010). Many speculate that contemporary Pakistan falls into this category. The Pakistani military, and in particular its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has sponsored terrorist groups that launch attacks in Afghanistan and India. It is not clear if the political leadership of the country has been aware of this sponsorship, exercises any influence over such terrorist operations, or is able to ensure that such sponsorship supports its larger political and diplomatic strategies.

Transnational terrorism can occur when groups not under the control of the source-country government oppose cooperation and launch terrorist attacks to "spoil" the development of more cooperative relationships (the seminal analysis of spoiling is Stedman 1997; for an important application to terrorism, see Kydd and Walter 2002). Spoilers are "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" (Stedman 1997:5). Cooperation between governments indicates that they are interested in peacefully settling their disputes, which puts them "at risk from adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who seek either to alter the process or to destroy it" (Stedman 1997:5).

Why would transnational terrorism be an attractive strategy for such spoilers? Recall from our earlier discussion that the answer to this question for groups actively sponsored by the source country was unclear. In contrast, the logic by which spoilers can benefit from transnational terrorist is straightforward. As Kydd and Walter (2002) explain, spoilers use terrorism to influence the target state's subjective beliefs about the true intentions and capabilities of the source state. When states intensify their cooperation, each is uncertain if the other will continue to cooperate or will "defect" and exploit their partner (Keohane 1984). Terrorist attacks launched in the midst of new bilateral cooperative actions reduce the target state's belief that the source country is genuinely interested in and capable of improving their relations. If the target concludes that the source exercises effective control over terrorist groups, the attacks will strengthen the belief that the source is using terrorist violence as a covert tool for improving its bargaining position. From the spoiler's perspective, this is a desirable outcome, as the target is likely to react by limiting subsequent cooperation. Alternatively, the target state may believe that the source country's government is, in fact, genuinely interested in cooperation, but lacks the capability to control terrorist groups that operate from its territory. In this case, the target state will attach less value to cooperation with the source country. This is because the target country must now deduct the cost of additional terrorist attacks from the benefits it expects to accrue from cooperation with the source. From the spoiler's perspective, this is a useful development since it also results in the target state having less interest in cooperation with the source country.

How can this argument be reconciled with studies (e.g., Conrad 2011; Findley et al. 2012) that find that hostile relations between states leads to more terrorism? Our reasoning hinges on the distinction between terrorist groups who are simply based in a source country and those who are subject to considerable and active control by the source-country government. Making this distinction is often difficult. Pakistan, again, illustrates this problem. Pakistani governments and military authorities deliberately created and sponsored terrorist and insurgent groups in earlier decades with the aim of punishing neighboring states, such as Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and India. These groups, however, have become increasingly independent of state control and use violence in ways not sanctioned by Pakistani political or military authorities (Rashid 2012). This example illustrates the difficult principal-agent problems states face when they sponsor terrorist groups. State sponsors of terrorism want to exercise control over the use of violence by such groups, so that it can be integrated with other elements of the country's foreign policy (Byman 2005). But as discussed earlier, they also want their sponsorship to remain covert. This drives state sponsors to devolve significant operational autonomy to the groups that they sponsor. While direct state sponsorship and control of transnational terrorist groups was common until the 1980s, relations between states and terrorist groups have become more complex since the end of the Cold War, which is the period we examine. State sponsorship has declined, and more common today are states that permit terrorist groups to operate with some impunity from their territory or that are incapable of eliminating terrorist groups based within their borders (Byman 2008). In other words, the links between "principals"—state sponsors of terrorism—and "agents"—terrorist groups—have become weaker in the post-Cold War era (Byman and Kreps 2010). This trend has made it difficult to determine if a particular group receives any support from a state, from elements of the security services within a country, or is supported by actors outside of the state (Byman and Kreps 2010).

This weakening of state sponsorship and control has important implications for the behavior of transnational terrorist groups. Devolving operational independence to terrorist groups may lead them to select members who favor the use of terrorist violence over other strategies. One way to think about this is in terms of Stedman's (1997) spectrum of spoilers. At one end are "limited" spoilers, who may be satisfied by marginal changes in the status quo; at the other are "total" spoilers, who "are irreconcilably opposed to any compromise" (between these two extremes are "greedy" spoilers, whose goals are more heavily influenced by the costs and risks of action; Stedman 1997:11). We suggest that the goals of spoilers willing to engage in transnational terrorism are likely to lie at the "total" end of the spectrum of spoilers. Terrorism is a risky business for its perpetrators. The sponsors of transnational terrorist groups—whether they are states or other actors—worry that their agents will "shirk" and avoid engaging in acts of violence

that place them in danger of being captured or killed. To prevent shirking, sponsors select as agents groups and individuals who are most committed to the use of violence and least interested in compromise and cooperation with the target country (see Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Shapiro 2013; Siqueira and Sandler 2010). This means that opposition to cooperation is hardwired into the terrorist group. But the interests of the state that originally sponsored the group may be more likely to change over time. A state that opposes cooperation today may shift its position and favor more cooperation tomorrow. Such a shift might come about because a new government takes power, for example, because of exogenous changes in the benefits of cooperation, or for a range of other reasons. This divergence between the interests of the original sponsor and its hard-line terrorist group will prompt the latter to engage in transnational attacks aimed at undermining interstate cooperation.

Our theory suggests, then, that terrorist organizations directed by states and terrorist organizations acting independently should respond to interstate cooperation in systematically different ways. First, groups sponsored by the source government will have less incentive to respond to such gestures with terrorism. The benefits to the source government of such attacks are ambiguous, as discussed earlier. This suggests that the source government would be more likely to prohibit (or at least refrain from encouraging) attacks on the target. Independent spoilers, by contrast, have reasons to respond to positive gestures by attacking the target, as doing so is consistent with their objectives of undermining trust and cooperation between the source and target states. A second difference concerns the time horizons of terrorist groups that are directly sponsored by the source and those that are not. If the source state is interested in and currently engaging in cooperation with another country, it will likely press its terrorist "agents" to refrain from violence in the short run. Spoiler groups outside of the control of the state, on the other hand, have stronger incentives to attack as the two states begin to cooperate, since doing so maximizes the chance that they can upset the development of more cooperative relations. Finally, terrorist groups covertly sponsored by the source have incentives to mask this sponsorship, since revelation of this relationship will harm the sponsor's reputation in the international community and at the bargaining table. Spoilers want the target state to know that they originate in the source country, since this information might convince the target that the source is untrustworthy or unable to control militants within its borders.

Contra the first hypothesis, we therefore expect the following trend in transnational terrorism:

H2: Among dyads, an increase in positive gestures from the target to the source country is associated with more transnational terrorist attacks against the target that originate in the source country.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

Findley et al. (2012) hold that the directed dyad is the most appropriate unit when examining how interstate interactions influence transnational terrorism. The directed dyad unit of analysis allows us to identify the directionality of our key independent variables, *Positive Gestures* and *Negative Gestures*, and the opportunity to control for a number of factors that are thought to drive interstate conflict and cooperation. Our analysis is based on directed dyad months from 1990 through 2004. We focus primarily on politically relevant dyads, which offer a better test of our hypotheses because international cooperation and conflict are as much a function of opportunity as motivation (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1997).¹

The dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks per month that originate in the source country and are directed at the target. Our source for this variable is the *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events* dataset (ITERATE), which compiles information on all transnational terrorist attacks (Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, and Flemming 2003). For each attack, ITERATE identifies the nationality of the perpetrator and the victim. We code the perpetrator as the source country and the victim as the target country.² For example, in the year 2000, ITERATE identifies two attacks in which the terrorist was an Iranian citizen and the victim of the attack was an Israeli citizen. In this case, we consider Iran to be the source country of the attack, and Israel to be the target of the attack. In the full dataset, the number of attacks committed by one state's citizens against another state ranges from 0 to 22 per month, with the vast majority of directed dyads experiencing no attacks in a given month.

The key independent variables come from a dataset developed in King and Lowe (2003). They apply a coding scheme to Reuters news reports to extract events describing the source and target of diplomatic actions, the type of action taken, and the date of the action. Actions taken by states in the dataset are classified into one of 157 types of events, according to a typology developed by Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, and Taylor (2003). We utilize four measures from the data. The first is a count of the number of actions per month from the target country directed at the source country

¹We operationalize political relevance as dyads that include contiguous states or at least one major power. For a complete discussion of the relative merits and drawbacks of focusing on politically relevant dyads, see Lemke and Reed (2001).

²Since terrorist attacks can be carried out by, and target, groups composed of more than one nationality, ITERATE identifies first, second, and third nationalities of both perpetrators and victims. We use only the first nationality for each. Only a very small number of attacks lack a first nationality for the perpetrator or victim. We also dropped cases where ITERATE did not identify the first nationality of the perpetrators and the victims. ITERATE does include a variable measuring state sponsorship of an attack, but data are missing for this variable for a large majority of observations.

that are cooperative in nature, which we term *Positive Gestures*. The number of positive gestures in a given directed dyad-month in our data ranges from 0 to 96. The second, *Negative Gestures*, is a count of the number of negative or hostile actions per month from source to target country. The maximum number of negative gestures in our data is 231. Positive gestures in the dataset can range from verbally expressing optimism to more costly actions such as promising military or economic support. Negative gestures can be as innocuous as expressing pessimism about a relationship or they can be more serious, such as mobilizing troops. Our hypothesis suggests that an increase in positive gestures is associated with more terrorist attacks directed at the target country. The events data developed by King and Lowe (2003) are well suited to assessing these hypotheses precisely because they include separate measures of positive and negative actions. Because some diplomatic actions are more salient than others, we also use measures of these variables that are weighted by their political significance according to the scale developed by Goldstein (1992).³ This scale ranges in value from -10 to 10. More-negative gestures are assigned lower values. For example, a positive event coded as "extend military assistance" is assigned a weight of 8.3, while less-cooperative but not hostile events such as "suspend sanctions" receive a weight of 2.9. We take the weighted sum of all positive or negative actions in a given month. The value of the weighted positive gestures ranges between 0 and 220, while the weighted negative gestures range from 0 to 2,087. Because we are interested in measuring terrorism *as a response* to diplomatic actions, simply analyzing the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable at time t creates potential endogeneity problems. In part, this is a function of the fact that our events data are aggregated to the monthly level. For example, imagine that country A cooperates with country B at the beginning of a particular month, and that a spoiler group based in state A responds with a terrorist attack on B later in the same month. State B is likely to respond with negative gestures after such an attack. But since our data are aggregated, all of these actions would be combined in the same observation. In other words, monthly aggregation does not allow us to determine, within the same month, if positive (or negative) gestures occur before or after a terrorist attack. We therefore follow the process outlined by Granger (1969) and include as independent variables monthly lags of our independent and dependent variables. This allows us to account for the persistence of terrorist attacks in previous periods and to better isolate the effects of *past* diplomatic actions on *future* terrorist attacks. To determine the most appropriate model specification, we analyzed models with up to

³Some studies using similar events data conclude that the raw count of positive and negative events are more meaningful than are the weighted scales (e.g., Pevehouse 2004; Schrot and Gerner 2002). We use both types of measures and find that they produce quite similar results, suggesting that the weighting scheme is not influencing the conclusions.

5 monthly lags each of the dependent and independent variables. We then compared the Akaike information criterion (AIC) from all models and determined that the specification with 3 lags of the independent variables and 5 lags of the dependent variable was the best fit.

The King and Lowe (2003) data only code interactions between national governments. They do not cover interactions between, for example, a government and nonstate actor within its borders or between a state and a nonstate actor located in another state. Importantly, this means that many of the conflicts that have been used to develop the theoretical logic of spoiling in intrastate disputes are not included in our data. This is thus a more stringent and appropriate test of our hypothesis, since we have dropped cases that we know from previous work are consistent with the logic of spoiling. For example, the interactions between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are excluded, and we also drop from ITERATE attacks by the Irish Republican Army on British targets. Both are conflicts that have been used to develop the logic of spoiling. These attacks correspond more closely to domestic rather than transnational attacks, and we thus exclude them. We also drop interactions between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, for two reasons. First, the Authority was not established until well into the period for which we have data. Second, we lack measures for many of our control variables for the Palestinian Authority.

We also control for structural and more slowly changing factors that influence transnational terrorism. States involved in rivalries are much more likely to experience transnational terrorism (Conrad 2011; Findley et al. 2012). We therefore control for such unusually hostile relationships so that we may isolate the effect of individual diplomatic actions. Data on interstate rivalries are taken from Hewitt (2005).⁴ States that are much stronger than their adversaries have also been found to be the target of more terrorist attacks (Sobek and Braithwaite 2005), so we control for the power distribution within the dyad. Data on state capabilities are based on the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).⁵ The variable

⁴Other widely used measures of rivalry end their data coverage in 2001, as do the Hewitt data. We chose to use these data because their clear coding rules allow them to be extended through 2004, which is the last year of our measures of cooperation and conflict. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, might lead to different relationships between cooperation, conflict, and terrorism, so extending our measures beyond this year was important to capture any such effects. Hewitt identifies interstate rivalries based on a crisis density approach. With these criteria, we used the International Crisis Behavior primary dataset to update the list of rivalries through 2004. We also follow the various coding rules that determine the length of time following a crisis before a rivalry “fades out.” For instance, a dyad with three previous crises is coded as terminating 17 years following the final crisis. We focus exclusively on the most contentious of rivalries, “enduring rivalries,” which occurs when a dyad experiences three or more crises lasting longer than 20 years.

⁵State capabilities are measured through an index that includes a state’s total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. The measure is available for all states across the entire temporal period of this study. Higher values of the capability score indicate a stronger or more powerful state.

is created by taking the capability score of the source state in a dyad and dividing it by the sum of the capabilities of both states. The variable ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating a perfectly dominant target state and 1 indicating a perfectly dominant source state. We also control for whether the states in the dyad are both democratic. Substantial evidence suggests that joint democracy reduces the probability of international conflict (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993), yet its effect on transnational terrorism is unclear since democracies are more often the targets of terrorism (e.g., Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001; Lai 2007; Pape 2003). We add several other standard conflict variables to our models, including whether the states in the dyad share a defensive alliance, whether they are contiguous, whether one or more of them is a major power, and the total distance between their national capitals.⁶ Finally, we include a measure of dyadic trade, which is the total value of imports and exports between the two countries (Gleditsch 2002). Higher levels of trade are expected to mitigate the incentives for conflict, and we expect this to be true of transnational terrorism, as well.

ANALYSIS

Table 1 summarizes the results from four models. The dependent variable for each is the number of transnational terrorist attacks committed by citizens of the source country against the target country. Models 1 and 2 present the results from analyses using all directed dyads, 1990–2004, while Models 3 and 4 present the findings using politically relevant dyads during the same period. The key independent variables are counts of diplomatic gestures by the target country directed toward the source country (Models 1 and 3) or the weighted value of those actions (Models 2 and 4). The estimation technique is negative binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered on the directed dyad. The negative binomial is appropriate because it allows us to account for the overdispersion that characterizes our data. All models also include the control variables discussed earlier, 5 monthly lags of the dependent variable, and 3 monthly lags of the *Negative Gestures* and *Positive Gestures*.

In each of the unweighted models (Models 1 and 3), negative gestures from the target to the source are positive and statistically significant in the current month. The three-month lagged version of this variable is also positive and significant in Model 3. It is unsurprising that the number of negative gestures from target to source are positively correlated with terrorist attacks

⁶States are considered contiguous if they share a land border and are considered allies if they have entered into a formal defensive, offensive, or a neutrality agreement. Distance is calculated as the natural log of the total miles between state capitals. All of these variables are generated using the EuGene software package, version 3.204 (Bennett and Stam 2000).

TABLE 1 Diplomatic Gestures and Transnational Terrorism, 1990–2004. Dependent Variable: Monthly Terrorist Attacks Against Target State Originating in Source State

	All Dyads		Politically Relevant	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Positive Gestures _t	0.16*** (0.04)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.05*** (0.01)
Positive Gestures _{t-1}	0.04 (0.03)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)
Positive Gestures _{t-2}	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)
Positive Gestures _{t-3}	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Negative Gestures _t	0.48** (0.21)	0.08* (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)	0.02 (0.01)
Negative Gestures _{t-1}	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.05** (0.03)	-0.01* (0.01)
Negative Gestures _{t-2}	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
Negative Gestures _{t-3}	0.05 (0.03)	0.01* (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01*** (0.01)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-1}	3.80*** (0.40)	3.78*** (0.39)	2.50*** (0.23)	2.49*** (0.24)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-2}	2.59*** (0.34)	2.59*** (0.36)	1.66*** (0.20)	1.65*** (0.21)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-3}	2.05*** (0.39)	1.99*** (0.39)	1.81*** (0.26)	1.77*** (0.26)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-4}	1.69*** (0.48)	1.70*** (0.51)	1.08*** (0.24)	1.07*** (0.24)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-5}	3.10*** (0.37)	3.11*** (0.34)	2.19*** (0.26)	2.22*** (0.27)
Power Ratio	-1.68*** (0.14)	-1.67*** (0.13)	-2.43*** (0.18)	-2.42*** (0.18)
Rivalry	1.35*** (0.45)	1.45*** (0.42)	0.69* (0.37)	0.80** (0.35)
Alliance	1.13*** (0.16)	1.12*** (0.15)	1.10*** (0.19)	1.08*** (0.19)
Contiguity	0.58*** (0.11)	0.58*** (0.11)	0.16 (0.15)	0.16 (0.15)
Ln(Distance)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.05)	0.07 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)
Joint Democracy	0.33*** (0.11)	0.33*** (0.11)	0.29** (0.14)	0.28** (0.14)
Major Power Dyad	2.27*** (0.12)	2.29*** (0.11)	0.06 (0.30)	0.06 (0.30)
Dyadic Trade	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)
Constant	-5.76*** (0.46)	-5.75*** (0.46)	-6.89*** (0.66)	-6.87*** (0.66)
Observations	5,634,506		466,644	

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed). Positive and Negative Gestures are directed from target state to source. Unweighted model uses count of diplomatic gestures. Weighted model uses count of gestures weighted by severity. Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad in parentheses.

from source to target in the same month; indeed, we find this to be the case for several of the models. Targets of terrorism are likely to respond with negative actions directed at the source of such attacks that occur in the same month, creating the problem of endogeneity discussed earlier. In an effort to avoid such issues, we focus primarily on the effect of negative gestures from target to source in earlier months. The results indicate that lagged negative political actions do not have a consistent effect on the number of terrorist attacks. In Model 1, for example, all lagged negative actions have an insignificant or *negative* effect on terrorism. Positive gestures, however, seem to have a more consistent effect on the number of terrorist attacks committed against the target by citizens of the source state. The coefficient on positive actions in the current month are positive and significant in Model 1. And in Model 3, the current month, one month prior, and two months prior are all positive and significant. Furthermore, positive gestures have a substantively sizable effect on terrorism, outlined in Table 2. Among politically relevant dyads, each positive gesture in the current month increases the expected number of terrorist attacks by 12.7%, while each positive action in the previous month is associated with a 3.5% increase in terrorist attacks. Of course, transnational terrorist attacks are very rare, occurring in less than 1% of the 466,644 dyad-month observations included in Model 3. This means that the absolute level of transnational terrorist attacks does not change very much after cooperation, but the risk of future attacks increases noticeably from this low, baseline level.

It is possible that different types of negative or positive gestures could have distinct effects on transnational terrorism. For example, if positive gestures lead to more terrorism, we would expect that verbal support for the source's foreign policy by the target would exert a smaller influence on attacks than would a promise of military support by the target for the source. Models 2 and 4 seek to account for this possibility. They are identical to Models 1 and 3 respectively but use the weighted sum of gestures rather than

TABLE 2 Percentage Change in Expected Count of Terrorist Attacks

	Politically Relevant (Model 3)
Positive Gestures _t	+12.7%
Positive Gestures _{t-1}	+3.5%
Positive Gestures _{t-2}	+4.9%
Positive Gestures _{t-3}	NS
Negative Gestures _t	+14.3%
Negative Gestures _{t-1}	-5.1%
Negative Gestures _{t-2}	NS
Negative Gestures _{t-3}	4.9%

Note. All estimates represent change in expected count for each additional gesture. NS means coefficient not significant in model 3.

the raw count. These results are quite similar to those for Models 1 and 3. Weighted positive gestures by the target in the current month and one month earlier are associated with more terrorist attacks against the target. This is true among all dyads, as well as politically relevant dyads. Additionally, among politically relevant dyads, positive gestures from two months prior significantly increase the amount of terrorism. The substantive size of these effects are smaller than they are in the unweighted models because the range of the weighted measures is greater than that of the unweighted measured (for politically relevant dyads, the average increase in terrorist attacks is about 3% for a one-unit change in the weighted measure of positive gestures). Models 2 and 4 also indicate that negative actions in previous months do not have a consistent impact on transnational attacks, and in some cases, they are actually associated with *fewer* attacks.

Taken together, Models 1 through 4 suggest three important conclusions. First, short-term interactions between countries influence which states become targets of transnational terrorist attacks. Second, positive actions by the target country are associated with more, not less, subsequent terrorism from the source to the target. Third, negative actions in previous months do not consistently affect transnational terrorist attacks in the current month. This conclusion is particularly interesting when taken in the context of other studies that have found that generally hostile relationships, such as rivalries, lead to more terrorism. According to some of our models, rivalry does indeed increase the number of transnational attacks that states experience, but short-run negative diplomatic actions often have no significant effect and may even have a pacifying influence.⁷

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Domestic Sources of Terrorism

There are a number of difficulties associated with identifying the origins and motives of groups that engage in transnational terrorist attacks. In particular, data on transnational attacks inadvertently capture some attacks motivated by domestic factors in the target state. For instance, our coding of the ITERATE data identifies terrorist attacks in Guatemala perpetrated by Mexican citizens in the early 1990s. But these events are likely related to the Zapatista Rebellion and/or the Guatemalan Civil War and have little to do with diplomatic relations between the two countries. Such attacks may actually be driven by domestic rather than international politics but coded as transnational terrorist attacks because of data limitations or the unintentional killing of a foreign national. More recently, rebels in Colombia launched a

⁷Importantly, *rivalry* is not included in the list of possible diplomatic actions. It is a term that broadly describes an interstate relationship, rather than a specific action or set of actions.

terrorist attack aimed at a former interior minister on the same day that a free trade agreement with the United States went into effect. Here both the perpetrators and the victims were of the same nationality, and thus this attack would not show up in the ITERATE data, despite the fact that it may be connected to cooperation between Colombia and the United States (Mapstone 2012).

Recognizing these measurement issues, we check the robustness of our results with an alternative research design that does not require us to know the nationality of the perpetrators of a terrorist attack. We use the total monthly count of *all* transnational terrorist attacks committed within the target state as the dependent variable. Since all transnational terrorist attacks in the state are included in the analysis, we now control for both domestic and international motivations for terrorism. By doing so, we take the universe of transnational attacks in a state and account for a wider range of possible causes, allowing us to isolate the specific influence of interstate diplomatic actions. To the battery of conflict control variables described earlier, we add the total population of the target state, since larger populations present greater challenges for counterterrorism efforts (Ross 1993). Economic grievances by citizens are also thought to increase the use of terrorism (Li 2005; Li and Schaub 2004), so we include a measure of real GDP per capita. Li (2005) also finds that the amount of executive constraints on a state's leader is positively related to the amount of terrorism a state experiences.⁸ Finally, scholars have recently begun to emphasize the role of states' behavior toward their citizens in provoking or reducing terrorism (Walsh and Piazza 2010). To account for state behavior, we include in our models a measure of physical integrity rights, with higher values representing states that better protect the physical integrity rights of their citizens (Cingranelli and Richards 2004).⁹ States that regularly abuse the rights of their citizens are expected to generate more terrorist attacks. Once again, we include 3 monthly lags of each independent variable and 5 monthly lags of the dependent variable.

We present the findings from the alternative research design in Table 3. The key findings from Table 3 are consistent with those in Table 1. Among all dyads, positive diplomatic actions directed toward the source by the target in the current month, one month prior, and three months prior, are all associated with more terrorist attacks against the target. The same effects are at work among politically relevant dyads. In Model 8, for instance, positive actions in the current month, and two out of three months prior are associated with more terrorist attacks.

⁸Population is drawn from the World Bank (2002). GDP per capita is compiled by Gleditsch (2002), and the level of executive constraints come from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2006).

⁹The scale ranges from 0 to 8, with a score of 0 indicating extensive disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonments, and torture of citizens.

TABLE 3 Diplomatic Gestures and Transnational Terrorism, 1990–2004. Dependent Variable: All Monthly Terrorist Attacks Against Target State

	All Dyads		Politically Relevant	
	Model 5 Unweighted	Model 6 Weighted	Model 7 Unweighted	Model 8 Weighted
Positive Gestures _t	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)
Positive Gestures _{t-1}	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)
Positive Gestures _{t-2}	0.01** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Positive Gestures _{t-3}	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)
Negative Gestures _t	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Negative Gestures _{t-1}	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Negative Gestures _{t-2}	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Negative Gestures _{t-3}	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-1}	0.55*** (0.01)	0.55*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-2}	0.32*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-3}	0.19*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-4}	0.29*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)
Terrorist Attacks _{t-5}	0.28*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Power Ratio	-0.78*** (0.02)	-0.78*** (0.02)	-1.34*** (0.05)	-1.34*** (0.05)
Rivalry	0.21* (0.12)	0.22** (0.12)	0.40** (0.16)	0.42*** (0.16)
Alliance	0.16*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)
Contiguity	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.26*** (0.08)	-0.26*** (0.08)
Ln(Distance)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)
Major Power Dyad	0.66*** (0.02)	0.66*** (0.02)	0.82*** (0.09)	0.82*** (0.09)
Dyadic Trade	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.01*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)
Population	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)

(Continued)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

	All Dyads		Politically Relevant	
	Model 5 Unweighted	Model 6 Weighted	Model 7 Unweighted	Model 8 Weighted
Executive Constraints	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.20*** (0.01)	-0.20*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.01)
Constant	-1.70*** (0.07)	-1.70*** (0.07)	-0.98*** (0.19)	-0.98*** (0.19)
Observations	4,467,544		336,110	

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed). Positive and Negative Gestures are directed from target state to source. Unweighted model uses count of diplomatic gestures. Weighted model uses count of gestures weighted by severity. Robust standard errors clustered on the dyad in parentheses.

Negative actions in previous months rarely have a statistically significant relationship with terror attacks against the target in the current month. Whenever there is a significant relationship, the results indicate that negative political actions by the target state are generally associated with *fewer* terrorist attacks committed against the target state. In all four models, an increase in negative gestures by the target in month $t-2$ decreases the number of attacks against the target in month t . These models lead us to conclude that accounting for factors associated with domestic terrorist attacks does not vitiate the conclusion that positive actions by the target state invite more transnational attacks.

The effect of positive gestures by the target, to this point, has been consistently associated with greater terrorist attacks. In all eight of the models summarized in Tables 1 and 3, positive gestures by the target have a statistically significant and positive relationship with transnational terrorist attacks committed against the target. This relationship is robust across different methods of measuring the independent variables, as well as across two distinct research designs. There is some evidence that negative actions by the target lead to fewer terrorist attacks, but most often, lagged negative actions are statistically unrelated to terrorist attacks. A reasonable conclusion to draw is that negative actions by the target do not exercise a sizable or consistent influence on terrorist attacks.

Turning to the control variables, we see a number of consistent patterns across the models that are worth noting. *Power Ratio* has a consistently significant and negative effect on transnational attacks against the target state. This indicates that as the source state grows stronger compared to the target state, the target state experiences fewer terrorist attacks. States involved in a rivalry or an alliance are also generally more likely to experience transnational terrorist attacks, consistent with previous literature. In Table 3, the control variables *Population*, *GDP Per Capita*, *Executive Constraints*, and *Physical*

Integrity Rights all measure domestic characteristics about the target state that may influence the level of terrorism it experiences. These variables are all statistically significant (though *Executive Constraints* is significant in only half of the models), suggesting that the strategy of including them in the later models may account for measurement error in our dependent variable. Finally, the lagged values of our dependent variable are always significant and positive, indicating that terrorist attacks in previous months are strong predictors that a state will experience more terrorism in the future.

Rivalry and Alliance Dyads

Existing findings in the terrorism literature suggest that certain types of dyads might systematically respond to changes in diplomatic relations differently than other types of dyads. For instance, Findley et al. (2012) find that interstate rivalries increase incentives for terrorist organizations in one country to attack targets in the rival country. Since rivalries represent long-standing grievances between two states, it stands to reason that terrorist organizations in rivalry dyads might have significant grievances against the other state and therefore more incentives to launch attacks. We might expect, therefore, that the effect of positive gestures on terrorism identified in the preceding analysis would be more pronounced in rivalry dyads. Similarly, Neumayer and Plümper (2010) demonstrate that allied dyads experience more transnational terrorism than nonallied dyads. They theorize that the increased level of terrorism occurs because terrorist organizations in one country object to foreign military and diplomatic support of their home government. This raises the possibility that the results we have presented thus far are capturing opposition to an alliance generally, rather than opposition to specific cooperative gestures and peace processes.

If either of the expectations about rivalry dyads or allied dyads are valid, then simply controlling for these variables may not be sufficient. We need to determine if the effects of our independent variables on terrorism are systematically different among these subsets of interstate dyads. We therefore reanalyze the unweighted models (Models 3 and 7), but limit our sample first to only rivalry dyads and then to only allied dyads. The results of these models are available in the online appendix.¹⁰ In none of the models do we find consistent results suggesting that either rivalry dyads or allied dyads experience more pronounced effects from positive diplomatic gestures than other types of dyads. On the contrary, most of the positive and negative diplomatic gesture variables are insignificant in these subsamples. We also analyzed the full sample of directed dyads, interacting either rivalry status or alliance status with each of the 8 independent variables.

¹⁰The results are listed in Tables 5 and 6 of the online appendix.

We then plotted marginal effects of the independent variables at different values of the rivalry and alliance variables, and the effects are almost always insignificant.

The results of these additional models suggest that our main results are artifacts of neither rivalry nor alliance relationships. In other words, the effect of positive diplomatic gestures between states seems to exist independent of the overall type of relationship that the two states share. Cooperation between states generates incentives for terrorist organizations to launch transnational attacks, independent of the long-term relationship between the states.¹¹

Further Robustness Checks: Random Effects and Rare Events

To further assess the robustness of our conclusions, we use additional independent variables and model specifications. We report these statistical results in tables in the online appendix and summarize them here, as they are consistent with the main results. All of the robustness checks have the same format as the politically relevant dyad models from Tables 1 and 3.

The first robustness check accounts for the possibility of bias in our original estimates, given that many of our control variables are largely time invariant within each directed dyad (since they are measured annually, while our key independent variables are measured monthly). We incorporate random effects into our original models and find that our primary conclusions do not change. Specifically, in both the weighted and unweighted specifications from Table 1 (Models 3 and 4), all positive gesture variables are significant and positive (with the exception of the three-month lag), while only two negative gesture variables are significant, and they are both negative. Incorporating random effects into Model 7 also largely corroborates our results, though all lagged gesture variables become insignificant in Model 8.

Second, we replicated our models, but using a rare events logistic approach. This accounts for the fact that transnational terrorist attacks occur infrequently in the directed dyad-months in our dataset. We transformed the dependent variable so that it takes a value of 1 if any terrorist attacks occurred in the dyad month, and a value of 0 otherwise. Again, lagged positive gestures are significantly and positively associated with terrorist attacks in most cases, while the coefficients on lagged measures of negative gestures are almost always insignificant and exert a negative influence when significant. The lagged dependent variables are positive and statistically significant in these models as well.

¹¹One interesting implication of these findings is that the results we presented earlier are being driven by nonrival, nonallied dyads. In other words, it seems that states with more “neutral” relationships are more likely to see terrorist attacks in response to cooperative gestures. We plan to analyze this further in future research.

CONCLUSIONS

How do positive and negative diplomatic gestures influence transnational terrorism? We argue that terrorist groups launch attacks to spoil cooperation between states. Our data analysis finds consistent support for this proposition. At the same time, we find that negative gestures do not have a strong or consistent influence on the patterns of transnational terrorism in the short run. In this section, we briefly discuss how future research can build on these findings and their implications for international cooperation.

Future work in this area could address implications of our core findings about cooperation, spoiling, and transnational terrorism. An important next step would be to more closely analyze the motives for transnational terrorism. Our statistical analysis suggests that spoiling cooperation is a key motive for transnational terrorist attacks. Case studies of transnational terrorist campaigns could complement this analysis by seeking to determine if terrorist organizations view transnational attacks as a sensible and strategic response to interstate cooperation they oppose. The data used in this article could be used to help select cases that are both consistent and not consistent with the logic of spoiling on which we build our analysis. Gerring (2007) argues that selecting cases in this manner, then engaging in a close process-tracing of any links between the key independent variable and the dependent variable, is an effective way to synthesize large-*N* and small-*n* analysis of hypotheses.

Our core conclusion is that positive diplomatic gestures invite terrorism. Does this suggest that states should avoid cooperation? The answer to this question is *no*, for three reasons. First, we suggest it is spoilers that are primarily engaging in attacks. In this case, the target country could have incentives to cooperate even more closely with the source, or at least to exercise restraint in the face of provocative terrorist attacks. Such cooperation could demonstrate to the spoiler's supporters that their strategy was ineffective. It might also provide the source country with intelligence and political support it needs to crack down on domestic groups engaging in spoiling. India's response to terrorist attacks that originate in Pakistan exemplifies this. Terrorist groups based in Pakistan attacked the Indian parliament in 2001 and landmarks in Mumbai in 2008. In both cases, the Indian political authorities concluded that the wisest course of action was to avoid lashing out at Pakistan (Reidel 2011).

Second, terrorism is costly for target states. But this fact alone does not mean that it is always in the interests of the target to avoid cooperation. Successful cooperation will provide benefits to the target. It makes sense for the target to engage in cooperation when the benefits it provides exceed the costs of terrorist attacks. This may frequently be the case. Most transnational terrorist attacks harm small numbers of victims. Targets may simply conclude that this is a price worth paying in order to secure lasting cooperation with

another state. Third, our data on diplomatic gestures is derived from news accounts. This means that it only includes gestures that are public and that can be observed by domestic and international audiences. Much international bargaining takes place in secret, however (Kurizaki 2007). Sufficiently secret negotiations do not activate spoilers. This may alter the incentives of terrorists they host to engage in terrorism. This suggests that conducting some negotiations out of public view might reduce transnational terrorism in response to positive gestures.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank the editor and reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Data and replication files available upon publication at <http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/internationalinteractions>.

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