INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes how and why governments co-operating against an insurgency can effectively share intelligence. Host countries facing armed opposition on their territory often secure military and intelligence assistance from allied states. The US has devoted substantial diplomatic, military, and intelligence resources to assisting countries fight insurgencies in recent decades, for example. Major American commitments include aid to South Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, to Central American countries fighting insurgencies in the 1980s, to anti-narcotics and counter-insurgency efforts in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia at various points since the 1980s, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan more recently.

Insurgency has been for decades the most common type of organized conflict and accounts for most civilian and military casualties from war. Analyzing how states can co-operate by sharing intelligence provides the practical benefit of better understanding the strengths and weaknesses of various strategies for countering insurgencies. As discussed in the next section, intelligence-sharing is very important for effective counter-insurgency. Political differences are often an important barrier to successful counter-insurgency co-operation. The governments involved may face divergent political pressures that give them the incentive to cheat, shirk, or otherwise defect from co-operation with each other. Detecting such defection is especially difficult in the area of intelligence-sharing, since countries have good reasons to conceal many of their intelligence activities even from trusted partners. Existing research on counter-insurgency has identified many of the sources of these different political incentives. This work concludes that strong incentives to defect make mutually beneficial co-operation very difficult to achieve, and based on this advises governments to limit their dependence on others who do not share their goals.

This is not the only way that countries can address concerns about defection by their partners. States may also agree to create a hierarchical relationship, in which a
dominant state makes major decisions and directly manages and oversees the relevant actions of a subordinate country. Organizing intelligence-sharing in a hierarchical manner can provide both the dominant and subordinate countries with the benefits of more and better intelligence by reducing concerns about the others’ defection. Existing research on counter-insurgency does not recognize how states have used hierarchy to facilitate their co-operation and does not analyze the costs and benefits of this organizational form.

The specific cases selected for analysis – American co-operation with South Vietnamese in the late 1960s and early 1970s – are also useful for evaluating the theory of intelligence-sharing advanced here. This expects states to forge a hierarchical relationship for sharing intelligence when they can each reap substantial gains from sharing but have strong concerns about the reliability of their partner. American collaboration with South Vietnam conforms to this explanation. As important, it does not conform as closely to a rival explanation of hierarchy, which holds that more powerful states always impose this organizational form on subordinate states. The US’ power relative to South Vietnam did not change substantially during the periods considered here, but its interest in hierarchy did change with its perception of the joint gains available and the likelihood that its partner would defect.

INTELLIGENCE-SHARING AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Insurgents lack the military power to defeat their opponents on the battlefield. To compensate for this weakness they exploit the military advantages of launching surprise attacks and concealing themselves in rough terrain and among the civilian population. Governments can effectively counter the insurgents’ use of surprise and concealment only if they have accurate intelligence on their opponents’ plans and bases. All of the most-respected work on counter-insurgency emphasizes the importance of intelligence for this task.¹

Much intelligence collection and analysis for counter-insurgency is labor-intensive. It relies on the authorities being able to interact regularly with the population, and is most successful when the police and military can safely live and work in areas where insurgents are active. Since insurgencies usually hide among civilians and rely on them for support, persuading these non-combatants to provide government agencies with human intelligence on the identity, location, and activities of insurgents is also crucial. More technical approaches to collecting and analyzing intelligence can prove quite useful as well. Aerial reconnaissance and satellite imagery can monitor borders, track insurgents’ movements and activities, and prepare detailed maps of remote areas for military operations. Sensor technology may also assist in tracking the movement of insurgents in such remote areas. Intercepting telephone, radio, and other forms of communication can provide inside information on the organization of the insurgency.

The host country will typically have stronger capabilities in the collection of human intelligence, as its personnel speak the languages of the civilian population, know the terrain, interact with civilians on a regular basis, and have a wider array of punishments and rewards with which to control defectors, informants, and agents.² In the cases analyzed in this article, the US had a comparative advantage in the provision of
technical support for intelligence. It also had the financial resources to underwrite an expansion of the host’s intelligence efforts. There was thus a natural division of labor between the two types of countries, with South Vietnam concentrating on collecting human intelligence while the US provided financial support to the host and gathered technical intelligence.  

What are the implications of implementing such a division of labor? A technocratic perspective holds that the host and ally share a strong interest in defeating the insurgency. From this shared objective, each should have a similarly strong interest in providing their partner with any relevant intelligence they possess, since such intelligence will allow the partner to more effectively prosecute the campaign against their common enemy. Sharing is thus primarily a technical and organizational problem rather than a political problem. The host and ally need to agree on mechanisms to share intelligence efficiently; once such mechanisms are in place, relevant intelligence will flow freely between them. This perspective is often implicit in campaign histories written by military professionals, who because of their training and background devote less explicit attention to political divisions between allies, and more to the technical requirements that their respective military and intelligence agencies must meet in order to achieve putatively shared political objectives.  

An alternative draws attention to how political differences between the host and ally may create incentives to defect from a promise to share intelligence. While host and ally both seek to defeat the insurgency, they may favor different policies for achieving victory, one may be willing to pay higher costs than the other to achieve victory, or they may face internal difficulties in implementing an agreed counter-insurgency policy. These differences can create incentives for each to defect. Organizational and political barriers in the host country have attracted the most attention.  

Effective counter-insurgency warfare requires the willingness to expose government forces to attack and to continually defend civilian areas from insurgent activity. The host nation’s security forces often lack the proper organization and training required for effective counter-insurgency; indeed, such governmental weaknesses are an important reason why insurgencies are able to take root in the first place. But the host nation’s military is often not up to these tasks, and may distort or limit shared intelligence to mask its battlefield inadequacies from foreign supporters. Inadequate funding, training, and organization may also lead the hosts’ intelligence agencies to do a poor job of collating and analyzing intelligence from multiple sources. This may constitute defection to the extent that the host fails to exploit fully all of the advantages it has in the intelligence area.  

Another organizational weakness is corruption. Militaries and other government bureaucracies corrupted by the insurgency may share intelligence with the enemy or withhold intelligence they obtain from the ally. Insurgencies also find it easier to place agents that can provide them with intelligence in corrupt bureaucracies. The host country’s political leaders may be divided among themselves, or differ from the professional military, about how best to prosecute the conflict with the insurgents. Political divisions create powerful reasons to defect from intelligence-sharing with the ally. Political or military leaders favoring compromise, for example, may share intelligence with the insurgents as part of an attempt to broker a peace deal, or withhold relevant
intelligence on the insurgency from the ally. Hardliners may distort shared intelligence to manipulate the ally’s conclusions about the performance of government forces or the capacity of the insurgency to fight. Political leaders worried about threats to their rule from the military or competitors within the government often compartmentalize government functions and limit the flow of information to maintain their authority. This may create internal intelligence agencies that compete with each other or fail to share information with each other or the ally.⁵

Allied countries also can face political incentives to defect. The ally may be less resolved to achieve victory than the host government, whose position in power is directly threatened by insurgency, or may have regional interests that conflict with its willingness to prosecute the counter-insurgency vigorously. The ally may also prefer strategies and tactics that differ from those preferred by the host nation. The host government, for example, may adopt a policy of brutalizing the civilian population into subservience, while the ally may object to this approach as immoral or as an ineffective way to conduct the counter-insurgency. The ally may press the host to reduce corruption, to better train its military forces or to integrate rather than compartmentalize its security agencies, all of which could threaten the host government’s hold on power. These conflicts of interest with the host may lead the ally to restrict intelligence-sharing out of fear that shared intelligence will be leaked to the insurgents by corrupt host government officials, obtained by the insurgency’s agents within the security services, or used to support unwanted military operations. Alternatively, the ally may withhold relevant intelligence from the host as a way to extract greater concessions on military strategy and tactics or government reform.

Work that pays attention to these concerns about defection concludes that hosts or allies will respond by trying to protect their intelligence sources and assets from each other. Byman, for example, advises that,

> To help overcome these problems [of defection], the US should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces so that it can better understand the true nature of their activities. To reduce its vulnerability to manipulation, the US should also try to diversify its intelligence sources to ensure that it does not rely exclusively on the local ally for information.⁶

Concerns about defection lead the host or ally or both to limit the intelligence that they share, conduct counter-intelligence operations on their putative ally, or replace intelligence that their partner could or did supply with intelligence generated by their own agencies.

**HIERARCHY AND CO-OPERATION**

The difficulty with this approach is that it assumes that states exist in an anarchic international environment, where each, by definition, retains its decision-making autonomy. This leads to the conclusion that the institutional arrangements states create to underpin their co-operation must be consistent with such autonomy. States may co-operate, but they do so at arms-length; each state independently determines, for
example, if it is going to co-operate with or defect from its partners. One consequence of this is that there may exist additional institutional forms to sustain co-operation. A second is that these forms might allow states to work together under conditions that existing understandings would expect to be too hostile for sustaining co-operation.

Under certain conditions, governments can and do deliberately agree to sacrifice some of their decision-making autonomy by subjecting themselves to a hierarchical relationship with a dominant state. The author draws on transaction-cost economics to explain the conditions under which states create monitoring and enforcement institutions and the types of institutions they will find most effective. Transaction-cost economics seeks to explain why some economic transactions take place at arms-length in markets, while others are organized through institutions such as firms. Actors must pay costs to engage in mutually beneficial transactions – they must expend time and effort searching for goods, bargaining over the terms of the exchange, monitoring the compliance of the other party, and punishing non-compliance.

The basic argument of transaction-cost economics is that actors will create firms, or other types of hierarchical institutions, when the transaction costs, such as concerns about defection, are sufficiently high. Scholars have begun to apply the insights of transaction-cost economics to international politics. David Lake has made the case that international relationships characterized by large joint gains, high costs of defection, and low governance costs are often governed through hierarchical rather than anarchic institutions. He has used transaction-cost economics to explain, for example, the differing organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War and why the US’s military co-operation during the twentieth century has varied between unilateralism, anarchic co-operation, and hierarchy. Others have used transaction-cost economics to better understand the organization of military alliances and to explain how hierarchy in the form of colonial empires depended in part on the factors identified by transaction-cost economics.

Work in this tradition holds that while sovereign states may be formal and legal equals, under some conditions they can and do develop hierarchical institutions that provide some states with the ability to directly manage and oversee the activities of others. Hierarchical relationships have a dominant state with responsibility for making major decisions, and a subordinate state that agrees to comply with these decisions. States negotiating a co-operative agreement are unable to foresee all the developments that might impinge on their joint venture. Participating states therefore always possess some leeway in how they interpret and implement the terms of their agreement to co-operate. Dominant states fear that their subordinates will exploit such ambiguities to defect. Hierarchy reassures the dominant state that subordinate partners will comply with the letter and spirit of their agreement to co-operate by giving it the right to interpret the agreement, to oversee the activities of the subordinate, and the legitimate right to punish defection.

The relationships among three variables explain the conditions under which states will develop hierarchy to govern their relations: 1) the joint gains produced by co-operation; 2) the costs of defection; and 3) the costs of creating managing a hierarchical relationship. Hierarchical arrangements are most useful to participants when there exist substantial benefits from co-operation, the costs of defection are also high, but
effective hierarchical arrangements can be created at a reasonable cost. Hierarchy makes it easier for each participant to capture some of the large available joint benefits of co-operation by reducing the chances that partners will impose substantial costs by defecting. Both dominant and subordinate states must pay some costs to negotiate and manage a hierarchical relationship. They do so when the benefits of hierarchy in terms of reduced defection outweigh these negotiation and management costs.

The costs of hierarchy are easiest to see for the subordinate state, which must surrender some freedom of maneuver and submit itself to the decisions of the dominant power. Subordinate states recognize and accept their inferior status because doing so sustains mutually beneficial co-operation with the dominant state by minimizing the chances that either party will defect. Subordinate states can receive important benefits in exchange for accepting their reduced status, such as economic aid or protection from external threats. Submission to a hierarchical relationship reassures the dominant state of its willingness to comply with the terms of their agreement, ensuring it will continue to accrue such benefits. Subordinate states would prefer to avoid the restrictions on their actions that hierarchy imposes. But this is often unrealistic; the dominant state will only agree to co-operate if the subordinate agrees to the limits that a hierarchy imposes. Participation in a hierarchy may be the best available outcome for such states.

Dominant powers must pay costs as well to create and sustain a hierarchy. They must devote resources to closely monitoring subordinates’ compliance, to providing the benefits outlined in their agreement to share, and to punishing defection. For one state to effectively play the role of the dominant partner, it must control considerable political and economic resources of value to the subordinate state. Such power resources allow the dominant state to offer more valuable benefits and to threaten effective punishment more credibly when it detects defection. While dominant states are more powerful than subordinates, this does not mean that they always insist on creating hierarchical arrangements. Dominant states would prefer to avoid the costs associated with creating and managing a hierarchical relationship. When partnering with a state unlikely to defect, dominant states can and should agree to less hierarchy in their relationship. The degree to which a dominant state desires to create a costly hierarchical relationship should thus increase with its estimates of the subordinate state’s likelihood of defection.

The key barrier to intelligence-sharing that hierarchy can help states overcome is concern about defection by their partners. A first hierarchical mechanism for promoting transparency has the dominant state directing and overseeing the policies and actions of agencies in the subordinate state. Here the dominant state intervenes to ensure that the decisions and policies of the subordinate state accord with its interests. The dominant state may assign its personnel to take on policy-making or operational tasks within agencies of the subordinate state. Seconded personnel are usually described as some type of technical advisor, and they are certainly in a position to provide the subordinate state with relevant knowledge. Their primary loyalty, however, is not to the subordinate state, or even to norms of their field of expertise, but to the dominant state that selected them and assigned them to this role. An important part of their role is to monitor the actions of the subordinate state. Their direct involvement in detailed policy-making and operations gives them specific street-level knowledge of
how policies adopted at the national level in agreement with the subordinate state are actually being implemented by partners that may face incentives to shirk.

A second mechanism has the dominant state financing actions of the subordinate. As in the case of secondment, there may be motives for financing in addition to monitoring. Providing financing gives the subordinate state more resources to carry out policies, and the dominant state targets the money that it provides on those policies that will serve its interests. But strings are always attached to such money. The subordinate state must only use the money for purposes specified by the dominant state, may be required to provide matching funds, and promises to provide accounting and other evidence that the funds are expended in the manner intended.

This monitoring of spending also provides a window on other, related actions of the subordinate state. For example, the dominant state may be concerned that the subordinate will use its funds to replace rather than supplement its own funding of some activities. The agreement to provide financing should call on the subordinate state to provide a range of budgetary data in order to address this concern. Such data is also useful to the dominant state in constructing a more comprehensive picture of the true actions and priorities of the subordinate state. Financing also provides the dominant state with an important tool with which to punish defection. It can threaten to withdraw this funding or shift it to other purposes if it discovers that the subordinate state has cheated on the agreement to share intelligence.

Third, dominant states can offer to train officials from and restructure bureaus in subordinate states. One objective of training and restructuring is to provide subordinate states with the technical knowledge and skills needed to implement policy more effectively. Training and restructuring can serve as an indirect form of monitoring as well. Training attempts to socialize students from other states into the goals and routines of the training state. Dominant states can also provide their partners with funds, equipment and technology, and organizational blueprints to alter the format of their agencies. The motive is to replace or supplant existing agencies that are seen as not sharing the objectives of the dominant state with new agencies that are socialized to the goals and methods of the dominant state.

These mechanisms limit the ability of the subordinate to defect. Subordinates will only agree to submit to a hierarchy if it includes constraints on the dominant power’s ability to defect. Dominant powers must pay costs as well to create and sustain a hierarchy. They must devote resources to closely monitoring subordinates’ compliance with the terms of their intelligence-sharing agreement, to providing the benefits outlined in their agreement to share, and to punishing defection. For one state to effectively play the role of the dominant partner, it must control considerable political and economic resources of value to the subordinate state. Such power resources allow the dominant state to more credibly threaten effective punishment when it detects defection. They also allow the dominant state to offer more valuable benefits to subordinates, such as security guarantees, military aid, and so on.

In addition to providing subordinate states with shared intelligence or other benefits, the dominant power must entice the subordinate power into entering the agreement by taking steps that make clear it will not use its greater power to exploit the junior partner. Dominant states can engage in co-operative ventures that deliberately expose them to
possible defection to demonstrate their faith in subordinate states. One mechanism for reassuring the subordinate state is to encourage each participant to specialize in some aspects of the intelligence collection and analysis effort. Another mechanism is the joint development and management of intelligence assets such as listening posts or networks of agents. Both specialization and joint investments give the subordinate state more potential to defect and thus more influence over their dominant partners.

INTELLIGENCE-SHARING WITH SOUTH VIETNAM

The remainder of this article evaluates this argument with case studies of intelligence-sharing between the US and Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Vietnam case is useful for evaluating the argument here regarding hierarchy for three reasons. First, the US adopted a policy change in 1967 that placed much greater emphasis on effective intelligence-sharing with the South Vietnamese government. Prior to this, US strategy relied most heavily on air strikes and offensive “search and destroy” missions to locate and engage insurgent forces. This strategy attached little importance to South Vietnamese military action and intelligence. The fact that the US did not depend on sharing intelligence with South Vietnam gave it little incentive to seriously address the consequences of defection by its partner.

By 1967, political and military setbacks led the US to adopt a counter-insurgency doctrine, termed at the time “pacification”, that focused on creating a secure environment for South Vietnamese citizens so that they would not support the insurgents. Successful implementation of this strategy required close co-operation with intelligence and security agencies of the South Vietnamese government, which were assigned responsibility for most human intelligence and for the provision of local security. This meant that effective intelligence collaboration with South Vietnam became much more valuable to the US, and that concerns about South Vietnamese defection became a more important influence on American policy.

As discussed earlier, this combination of large potential joint gains and serious concerns about defection is most conducive to the formation of a hierarchical relationship. The fact that the US moves, after 1967, to create important elements of hierarchy in its intelligence-sharing relationship with South Vietnam, is thus evidence that the theory advanced here can help us better understand the conditions facilitating intelligence-sharing. Second, many of the other variables that might influence the degree of US–South Vietnamese co-operation, including their relative power, their interests in the outcome of the conflict, and the degree to which each party was motivated to defect, did not change along with the shift in strategy towards pacification. The fact that these other potential influences remain constant indicates that the relationship between joint gains, defection, and hierarchy is a causal and not a spurious one.

A third advantage is that there is a wealth of declassified documents and secondary accounts available for this case. Due to its intrinsic importance for the subsequent evolution of American foreign policy, the Vietnam experience is often used to illustrate or understand the nature of insurgency and counter-insurgency. Yet none of these accounts has drawn explicit attention to the role of hierarchy in structuring the relationship. Transaction cost economics provides a theoretically-grounded explanation as
to why states would structure their relationship as a hierarchy, and thereby provides a richer and more accurate understanding of the dynamics of this case.

**Benefits of Intelligence-Sharing**

Effective intelligence-sharing was a crucial element of the pacification strategy that the US adopted in 1967. Both South Vietnam and the US could contribute valuable intelligence to this effort that the other found to be too costly and difficult to collect. Key to successful pacification was collecting intelligence that allowed the authorities to identify members of what were known in official circles as the “Viet Cong Infrastructure” (VCI). The VCI consisted of the enemy political leaders and guerrilla forces that used the cover of the South Vietnamese population to mask their identity, location, and activities while planning and carrying out political and military activities designed to undermine the South Vietnamese government. It also included agents and sympathizers in the police, military, and government, confronting the government with the challenge of carefully monitoring the activities of its own personnel. Good intelligence allowed the US and South Vietnamese to bring their superior military and organizational resources directly to bear against the forces seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the South Vietnam government.

South Vietnam contributed staff with skills useful for intelligence-collection and analysis at the local level, existing intelligence networks, and programs to facilitate the defection and resettlement of enemy personnel. The joint effort against the Viet Cong infrastructure was able to draw on South Vietnamese military officers, intelligence personnel, police officers and other civil servants to collect intelligence. As natives of the country, many of these government officials had more detailed knowledge of local languages and cultural practices, social and family ties and terrain, all of which were very useful for collecting intelligence and putting it in the proper analytical context. There were also far more of these South Vietnam personnel than their American counterparts. South Vietnamese government agencies, including the Army, Special Police, and Central Intelligence Organization had been in conflict with the Viet Cong for many years, also brought their existing networks of agents to the pacification strategy. The South Vietnamese government ran a defector program known as Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) to encourage Viet Cong cadres to abandon the struggle against the government and to provide it with intelligence, and maintained identification card schemes to track the movement of individuals in the country. The US would have been unable to collect very much intelligence of use to the pacification campaign without the active collaboration of the South Vietnam government.

The US had a comparative advantage in the provision of skills, money and technology. The American intelligence community included many experienced intelligence analysts familiar with techniques for collecting, organizing, and analyzing large amounts of information. The capability to organize a large-scale intelligence effort was very useful for the pacification campaign, which relied on the authorities being able to create reliable identification documents, build files on individual members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, and track their successes and failures in securing the countryside.
The US could also devote substantial financial resources to the development of an
effective intelligence infrastructure for the war. This included the deployment of many
civilian and military intelligence personnel to South Vietnam, as well as the provision
of funding for the creation and training of South Vietnamese intelligence officers in the
military and police. The US brought to the table technological assets that had some
value in the pacification campaign. These included aerial reconnaissance of the
theater, which sought to detect the movement of supplies and soldiers to the forces
fighting the South Vietnamese government, intercepting enemy radio communications,
keeping track of the organization and personnel of the VCI using information
technology. 11

Defection
The US had serious concerns about South Vietnamese defection from their joint intel-
ligence effort. The pacification strategy adopted in 1967 relied very heavily on
intelligence that could best be collected by South Vietnam. Earlier experience provided
many well-documented concerns about the reliability of South Vietnam when sharing
intelligence. These fell into four areas – the political orientation of South Vietnamese
leaders, the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese military, corruption, and the organi-
zation of the South Vietnamese intelligence effort.

The South Vietnamese government was organizationally and politically weak,
subject to frequent coups or attempted coups and had difficulty translating new policies –
such as pacification – into effective action on the ground. This made it difficult for the
Americans to trust that some of their South Vietnamese Army counterparts would treat
shared intelligence securely and would themselves pass along only reliable intelligence.
The division of the Army into political cliques and their constant plotting of coups dis-
tracted political and military leaders from the struggle against the Communists.

New South Vietnamese governments purged existing military officers and civil
servants on taking office to ensure that subordinates were loyal and as a source of
patronage, making it difficult to ensure continuity in the implementation of public
policy. South Vietnamese officials, including the officer corps, had different opinions
about how war should be prosecuted, with a considerable fraction in the mid- and late
1960s preferring the pursuit of negotiations with the enemy, contrary to the policy of
the US at the time. This led some Americans to worry that such officers might com-
promise the security of shared intelligence with the aim of undermining the official
strategy that eschewed negotiations. 12

Corruption was widespread among South Vietnamese officials, and Americans
worried that this allowed the enemy to recruit agents from within the South Vietnamese
government who could pass along shared intelligence provided by the US, or take
actions that prevented the collection of useful intelligence. The South Vietnamese
police, for example, compromised security by accepting bribes for releasing captured
Viet Cong suspects, allowing Viet Cong personnel and supplies to pass at checkpoints,
and for issuing identification documents. The South Vietnamese government had a
program that rewarded defectors and individuals who identified Viet Cong weapons
 caches, but not long after its introduction officials began organizing phony defectors for
financial gain. A Central Intelligence Agency report in 1970 estimated that there were at least 30,000 enemy agents within the government of South Vietnam.

American political and military leaders had a low opinion of the South Vietnamese military. The South Vietnamese army suffered from a high desertion rate and from draft evasion, was reluctant to put units into battle, preferring to keep them near their garrisons, often refused to patrol at night, and was led by a politicized and corrupt officer corps. In 1966, for example, the US privately estimated that fully one third of the South Vietnamese army was of unsatisfactory or marginal effectiveness. These weaknesses implicated the South Vietnamese army’s ability to undertake the roles assigned to it by the pacification strategy. It also undermined American trust in the intelligence provided by the South Vietnamese, who might share only intelligence that over-estimated the threat they faced with the objective of masking their own failures.

Finally, organizational and political factors created incentives for South Vietnamese intelligence organizations to hoard information rather than share it with each other and with the US. Military commanders often refused to share information with each other, preferring to bring valuable intelligence directly to the president. They also worried that other South Vietnamese and American agencies might use shared intelligence to learn the identity of, and seek to recruit or inadvertently reveal the identities of, their agents providing intelligence on the VCI. Organizational mechanisms for sharing intelligence among the South Vietnamese military, police, and intelligence agencies were poorly developed. Routines for sharing information between American and South Vietnamese agencies were even more problematic. One senior South Vietnamese military officer would later write that “although normal exchange [between the US and South Vietnam] of current information occurred as a matter of standing operating procedure at all combined intelligence agencies, there was definitely a lack of sharing when it came to important information of immediate consequence.”

South Vietnam also worried about the willingness of the US to share intelligence. American support was crucial to the survival of the South Vietnamese regime. This placed some limits on the extent to which the South Vietnamese could defy American wishes. South Vietnamese attempts to block the shift to pacification, which would include curtailing the intelligence-sharing needed to make this policy effective, might have frustrated the US enough to lead it to reduce or curtail its commitment to the regime. The South Vietnamese leadership also worried that the US might intervene in its domestic politics to ensure that the government was committed to its preferred strategy, as it had in 1961 when it encouraged the coup against President Diem. The fact that the US had large and independently-commanded military forces in South Vietnam, as well as naval aircraft and Air Force bombers based outside of the country, gave it some ability to prosecute the war as it wanted, despite the preferences of the South Vietnamese government.

These factors led South Vietnamese President Thieu to support the internal reforms that were needed to make pacification effective. He realized that the US was dedicated to the idea of implementing pacification, and worried that opposing it might alienate his patron. He also realized that implementing pacification would re-commit the US to the struggle in South Vietnam and lead it to continue to provide material support to the regime. Thieu was not forced by the US to take these actions; instead he shared many
of the concerns of his American advisors. Like them, he realized that the policy of search and destroy was not effective, especially after the surprise Tet offensive of 1968 that relied heavily on the VCI operating within South Vietnam. Thus, while the decision to shift to pacification, and to increase dramatically the importance of effective US–South Vietnam intelligence-sharing, was made by the Americans, it did have support at least from the leadership of South Vietnam, which recognized that subordinating itself to American leadership was an important way to ensure that the US remained committed to the struggle.18

**Search and Destroy: Intelligence-Sharing Outcomes**

Prior to about mid-1967, the American civilian and military leadership viewed the struggle in South Vietnam primarily as a conventional military conflict. Their strategy was that the US and South Vietnamese could prevail by defeating the enemy on the battlefield and destroying enemy troops and equipment. The US military’s strengths were using its higher technology weapons, better-trained soldiers and mobility to bring the fight to the enemy through bombings and “search and destroy” missions. Pacification efforts were very much secondary to this. The US expected South Vietnamese forces to hold the territory that they cleared of enemy forces, but not to be substantially involved in combat operations.

The political and organizational weaknesses of the South Vietnamese forces discussed above was an important reason why the US adopted this approach, which aimed to replace poorly-performing local forces with American bombers and ground troops. This meant that the US attached little importance to the South Vietnamese military contribution to the conflict. For this reason, effective sharing between the US and South Vietnam was not an American priority. The US did not worry a great deal about South Vietnamese defection from intelligence-sharing arrangements, and did not attempt to create a more hierarchical relationship between the two countries’ military and intelligence efforts.

Shortly before US ground forces began arriving in large numbers in 1965, American officials discussed creating a combined US–South Vietnamese military command. They saw as their model the joint command utilized in the Korean War, which gave the US the power to direct the efforts of both countries and to fire poorly performing Korean commanders. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara thought this would ensure unity of effort and allow the US to better supervise the actions and inactions of its ally, including those related to intelligence-sharing. But the American commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, opposed the suggestion of a combined command that would place him at the head of both countries’ forces.

Westmoreland held that a combined command would be viewed as an infringement on South Vietnam’s sovereignty and would therefore be opposed by some political forces in the country. He also drew attention to the difficulties of organizing staffs from different countries. But an important reason for his position, which he did not emphasize so as not to embarrass the South Vietnamese, was the security of shared intelligence. Westmoreland told his commanders in 1965 that “If the Vietnamese are brought into US operations far in advance compromise is probable,” while a memo
written by his command in Vietnam concluded that “no plan can be considered secure” if it is shared with the South Vietnamese. The fact that the US planned and carried out major military operations during this period largely independently of their South Vietnamese counterparts reduced the possible benefits of making many South Vietnamese privy to their plans. The American and South Vietnamese armies agreed instead to appoint “special representatives” to each others’ staffs, but these representatives would exercise little influence or do much to promote co-ordination of military and intelligence activities. 19

The American and South Vietnamese militaries did develop combined intelligence centers for prisoner interrogation, study of captured documents and equipment, and intelligence analysis that were designed to draw on American strengths in technical collection and analysis and Vietnamese local knowledge. But these combined centers never worked well. They did not develop clear rules for sharing between American and South Vietnamese elements. The US often refused to share the intelligence it collected through technical means, while the South Vietnamese bypassed established channels for sharing due to the desire to directly communicate intelligence to politicians or because of inter-organizational rivalries. Furthermore, the Central Intelligence Agency regularly recruited agents in the South Vietnamese Army and police. Since the South Vietnamese security agencies did not share intelligence with the US, these agents gave the Americans some insight into the intelligence they had collected. 20

Pacification: Intelligence-Sharing Outcomes

The US adopted the pacification strategy, which emphasized classic counter-insurgency doctrine, in 1967. Search and destroy presumed that American forces could locate the enemy. But the Viet Cong relied on indirect methods to achieve their aims. Rather than confront government and American military forces, they relied on tactics such as guerilla warfare, terrorism and assassination to exhaust and frighten their opponents. Pacification intended to collect intelligence that would allow the authorities to effectively counter these tactics by first identifying and then detaining, turning, or killing members of the VCI. American authorities recognized that successful prosecution of this strategy demanded close intelligence co-operation between the US and South Vietnam. 21

Both sides, but especially the US, worried that defection by the other would undermine such co-operation. The solution was to make their intelligence-sharing relationship more hierarchical. Hierarchy facilitated the mutually beneficial exchange of intelligence on the VCI by addressing each state’s concern about the defection of the other. Hierarchy allowed the US to more closely monitor and direct the intelligence activities of the South Vietnamese. It also meant that the US could work to alter and improve the intelligence capabilities and security of South Vietnamese government agencies and the country’s military forces. At the same time, it reassured the South Vietnamese that the US remained committed to aiding its ally in its political and military struggle.

From the perspective of the US, an important objective of the shift to pacification was to strengthen the South Vietnamese state’s legitimacy among the population and
capacity to address its internal security problems. But this effort risked creating the impression among the South Vietnamese leadership that the US’s true objective was to wind down its commitment to a conflict that was becoming very unpopular. The manner in which the US developed a more hierarchical relationship with South Vietnam addressed this concern. The US publicly re-committed itself to continuing to work with the South Vietnamese. This meant that the reputation of the US would suffer if it were seen to abruptly abandon its ally.

Even after President Nixon announced in 1969 a policy of “Vietnamization” aimed at transferring greater responsibilities to the regime in Saigon, the US maintained large numbers of military forces in the country and provided the regime with financial and military assistance. American authorities also made it clear that this new strategy simply could not work without the active collaboration of the South Vietnamese. This meant that the US was more reliant on its ally, and thus more vulnerable to any defection. This further reassured the South Vietnamese that the shift to pacification was not simply a prelude to an American withdrawal in the near future and that the US remained engaged in the conflict.

While they did not use the term hierarchy, the internal studies and discussions that led to the adoption of the pacification strategy recognized the need for it clearly, arguing that successful pacification would require the US to exert more leverage to induce South Vietnamese compliance.22 As one internal analysis put the problem, “much more can be accomplished by integration, unified management and joint co-ordination of the various programs in being . . . [and] can generate substantial influence and pressure on the [South Vietnamese government] at all levels to bring about an effective and co-ordinated operation against the VC infrastructure. For unified direction and for high-impact management of the various programs, reporting and information systems must be centrally designed, administered and controlled, and information specifications and criteria must be established centrally.”23

The US took three steps after 1967 that increased its influence over elements of the South Vietnamese government to improve intelligence-sharing in support of pacification. First, it increased the number of and importance of US military and intelligence advisors. Such advisors had long been attached to South Vietnamese military units. After 1967, the US deployed more advisors and improved the rewards that would accrue to career American military officers that served in these roles.24 It also began permitting advisors to accompany South Vietnamese forces on raids and other military actions. The declared objective of the advisor program was to improve the performance of the South Vietnamese military. But advisors also allowed the US to monitor its South Vietnamese ally’s actions on the ground. The advisors participated in the US, not South Vietnamese, chain of command, and issued reports to their superiors about the performance of the units to which they were attached. This meant that the US leadership no longer had to rely on South Vietnamese self-reporting on the tactics used by its military units.

Second, the US devoted time and resources to reorganizing the South Vietnamese government to more effectively prosecute pacification and to deal with corruption. American officials prodded the South Vietnamese to share intelligence among themselves. This included getting the South Vietnamese government to establish
intelligence co-ordination centers in each province and district that brought together local officials responsible for administration, police, civilian and military intelligence, and others to develop and disseminate common dossiers on suspected members of the VCI. The US persuaded the South Vietnamese to increase the importance of police forces which, given their frequent interactions with civilians and role in protecting the public, were seen as a crucial source of intelligence.

The American civilian agency in charge of pacification convinced the South Vietnamese government to allow the National Police to control its own training program and to select its personnel independently of the military, as well as to provide more resources to the Special Police, which was the police element most closely involved in pacification. Pressure from American civilian advisors also led to the creation of a ministerial-level pacification council that brought together senior government ministers to co-ordinate their actions and plans and encourage the sharing of intelligence among South Vietnamese agencies. American officials also created the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to measure the progress of pacification at the village level. The US insisted on playing a direct role in the development and maintenance of the HES to ensure it had under its control a reliable measure of the progress of pacification in the countryside, and to prevent South Vietnam from tampering with its structure or data.

Third, the US and South Vietnam developed the jointly-operated Phoenix program, which was designed to use intelligence, police work and military raids to find, turn, imprison, interrogate, or kill members of the VCI. Earlier South Vietnamese efforts in this area had not worked well. The US believed that captured members of the VCI could buy their freedom from corrupt officials, that the South Vietnamese focused too much effort on rounding up lower-echelon members of the VCI, who could be easily replaced, rather than the leaders, relied too heavily on paid informants for information and used torture and imprisonment indiscriminately, which produced little useful intelligence on the VCI and alienated the South Vietnamese population.

The US instituted common procedures intended to make Phoenix more effective. These included creating common rules for determining which individuals were actually members of the VCI, developing an improved system for maintaining intelligence files on suspected members of the VCI, and favoring payments to informants who provided reliable information about VCI leaders rather than foot soldiers. The US also sought to alter the manner in which the South Vietnamese treated suspects it had detained, although there is considerable debate about how effective this was. It ordered that the South Vietnamese focus on capturing rather than killing members of the VCI so that they could be interrogated for intelligence. It also sought to improve haphazard interrogation techniques and counter-productive use of violence against detainees utilized by many South Vietnamese military and intelligence personnel. This included improving the security of detention centers, training South Vietnamese interrogators, directly supervising the activities of such interrogators, and having American intelligence officers interrogate detainees directly or through interpreters.

Considerable direct and indirect evidence indicates that hierarchy lead to greater intelligence-sharing between the US and South Vietnam after the adoption of the pacification strategy in 1967. American officials believed that the strategy was effective; while problems remained, especially corruption, their overall assessment was that
pacification led to a more effective effort on the part of the South Vietnamese. The provision of rural security improved: between 1968 and 1970, the percentage of rural residents living in villages judged to be relatively secure increased by 20 percent. The Phoenix program captured or killed over 80,000 suspected members of the VCI; in accordance with American policy, many more were captured, and thus were of possible intelligence value, than were killed outright.

The Phoenix program led by the US also persuaded the South Vietnamese to shift more of its counter-insurgency focus towards the leaders of the VCI. Pacification also led to a change in the strategy of the enemy. Until about 1970, the enemy employed a strategy of insurgency that relied very heavily on the functioning of the VCI. After this period, the North Vietnamese shifted to a more conventional military strategy of confronting South Vietnamese and American units directly on the battlefield. This change in strategy was driven in large part by the success of pacification in curtailing the activities of the VCI. Pacification also succeeded in shifting more of the combat burden from American military units that sought to attack enemy forces to South Vietnamese forces, supported by American advisors and air power.

CONCLUSIONS

This article seeks to explain intelligence-sharing aimed at countering armed insurgencies. Counter-insurgency is a useful area in which to evaluate the explanation of hierarchy based on transaction-cost economics because intelligence is a crucial part of such campaigns. First consider how intelligence-sharing between the US and Vietnam evolved over time (see Table 1 on p. 297). Recall that the most important change here was the shift by the US from the policy of search and destroy to the policy of pacification beginning in 1967. This change in the overall policy for prosecuting the war altered the Americans’ thinking about intelligence-sharing in two related ways.

First, it led them to attach a higher value to effective intelligence-sharing with South Vietnam. Implementing pacification demanded more and more fine-grained intelligence on the activities of the VCI in civilian areas. South Vietnamese agencies were better equipped to collect and act on this intelligence. Second, the now greater benefit of intelligence-sharing reduced the net governance costs involved in creating and maintaining a hierarchical intelligence relationship between the two countries.

In other words, it became worthwhile for the US to actively monitor South Vietnam’s intelligence activities, since doing so would contribute in important ways to the success of the pacification program. At the same time, the shift from search and destroy to pacification did not have a noticeable influence on the incentives of either the US or South Vietnam to defect from co-operation. This combination of high joint gains, high likelihood of defection, and lower governance costs is when transaction-cost economics would expect the parties involved to create a hierarchical relationship.

The US and South Vietnam moved in this direction after 1966 and employed many of the mechanisms for hierarchy laid out earlier in this article. The most important elements of this new relationship were those that involved American monitoring of, or more direct control over, the activities of the South Vietnamese through the expansion of the number and range of activities of civilian and military advisors and the creation
of objective measures of progress. The US also provided South Vietnam with financial and technical support to better prosecute the counter-insurgency campaigns. This had the further benefit of giving the US a greater insight into South Vietnamese intelligence-sharing. The Hamlet Evaluation System is a good example. It drew on the Americans’ strengths in analyzing large quantities of intelligence in a systematic fashion. But it also created a metric for measuring progress on the ground that could not be easily manipulated by the South Vietnamese.

The US also undertook efforts to restructure South Vietnamese agencies so that they would be more effective in gathering, securing, and sharing intelligence. This training and restructuring also gave the US some ability to shape the goals of these agencies and to oversee their activities. In return for compliance with its leadership, the US offered important benefits to South Vietnam. These included material support for implementing the pacification strategy. They also included steps that had the effect of reassuring South Vietnam that the US would not itself defect by exploiting its dominant role in the relationship.

Devising and publicly committing itself to the new strategy of pacification rather than an alternative such as phased withdrawal of American forces, put the US’s credibility on the line in the conflict. Failure to live up to its commitment to South Vietnam might undermine the confidence of other allies in the US. The US also implemented pacification in a manner that provided South Vietnam with some political leverage. The pacification effort relied heavily on a division of labor between the US and South Vietnam, with the former specializing in financing and directing the joint effort and the latter focusing on human intelligence. This made the success of the American effort dependent on the active participation of the South Vietnamese government and authorities. It also meant that, if dissatisfied with the Americans’ actions, the South Vietnamese could undermine pacification by taking steps to slow its implementation.

Table 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnam Search and Destroy</th>
<th>Vietnam Pacification</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint gains</td>
<td>Small for US and</td>
<td>Large for US and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of deflection</td>
<td>High for South Vietnam,</td>
<td>High for South Vietnam,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low for US</td>
<td>Low for US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance costs</td>
<td>High compared to joint gains</td>
<td>Low for US compared to joint gains; moderate for South Vietnam compared to joint gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power imbalance</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Little sharing</td>
<td>Hierarchical sharing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the same time, this comparison of the search and destroy and pacification periods does not provide much support for alternative explanations of intelligence-sharing. The reason for this is that other independent variables that might influence the nature and extent of intelligence-sharing do not change between the two episodes. Particularly important here is the fact the relative power of the US and South Vietnam did not differ substantially. An important alternative explanation for the outcome of hierarchy is such power imbalances, which allow the more powerful state to insist on creating a hierarchy.

Despite the fact that the US had a great deal of leverage over South Vietnam during the search and destroy period, it did not insist on a hierarchical arrangement for sharing intelligence. Only when the Americans shifted to a policy of pacification did they conclude that the benefits of such a hierarchy would outweigh the costs. Furthermore, their desire to introduce elements of hierarchy was not resisted by the South Vietnamese government, which supported the shift to pacification and recognized that hierarchy would reassure the US of its willingness to support the new policy.

While it did want the US to recommit itself to the military campaign in South Vietnam, the Thieu government saw some important advantages from the adoption of pacification. Furthermore, the US clearly controlled more material power resources than did South Vietnam. But this does not necessarily mean that it automatically exercised complete control over the conduct of the war. The fact that the Johnson and Nixon administrations emphasized the damage to American security that would result from “losing” South Vietnam gave the smaller country considerable leverage over its more powerful ally. 31

In closing, the author would like to consider briefly two policy implications of this focus on how hierarchy can facilitate intelligence-sharing in counter-insurgency campaigns. First, to the extent that the explanation of hierarchy outlined here is valid, it implies that more and more successful co-operation should take place than other approaches would expect. Researchers who conclude that strong incentives to defect cannot be overcome, would be surprised by the degree of co-operation that occurred once pacification was implemented in the Vietnam case, for example. Second, allied states often emphasize that their involvement in the counter-insurgency campaign is limited to providing only enough support to allow the host to address its opponents on its own.

This was the Nixon administration’s policy of “Vietnamization” and has been an important part of American policy in contemporary counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Negotiating a hierarchical arrangement with these host countries makes it more likely that the host and ally can effectively co-operate by sharing intelligence. But it also might make it less likely that the ally can achieve its objective of quickly passing responsibility to the host. The reason is that hierarchy reserves most of the important decisions for the dominant state. The subordinate gains less experience with managing the campaign on its own, which delays its ability to learn to oversee the strategic and many operational aspects of counter-insurgency. In addition to this, the subordinate state may become quite satisfied with the status quo of a hierarchical relationship. As part of this relationship, the dominant state delivers many material and political benefits to the subordinate partner, which may find their continued delivery preferable to assuming the risks of making its own decisions and providing its own resources to wage the counter-insurgency.
NOTES


4. For example, the US Army’s recent counter-insurgency manual emphasizes the importance of the host nation’s agencies for collecting intelligence, but does not examine why such agencies might face incentives to avoid full sharing. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, op. cit., pp. 61–622.


6. Byman, “Friends Like These”, op. cit., p. 82.


18. Andrade, Ashes to Ashes, op. cit., p. 83; see also Colby, Lost Victory, op cit., p. 256.


22. Discussions of the shift in American policy from search and destroy to pacification include Andrade, *op. cit.*; Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era*, *op. cit.*; Hunt, *Pacification*, *op. cit.*; Edward P. Metzner, “More Than a Soldier’s War: Pacification in Vietnam”, *Pentagon Papers*, Vol. III, p. 55; and Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*, *op. cit.*. Pacification was a policy objective prior to 1967, but after this received much more high level attention, increased resources, and more aggressive pressure on the South Vietnamese government to ensure that it was implemented.


